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ABSTRACT 
There are sex differences in some cognitive functions. For example, earlier studies have 
shown that women outperform men on face recognition tasks, and women, in contrast 
to men, show an own-gender bias (i.e., women typically recognize more female than 
male faces). In the present thesis, the role of puberty, sex hormones, and attention, as 
well as neural correlates of the sex difference and women’s own-gender bias in face 
recognition were investigated.  
 
In Study I, the aim was to determine whether sex differences in cognitive abilities are 
magnified during early adolescence (ages 12-14), as a function of differences in age, 
hormone levels, and/or pubertal development. The results showed that boys’ advantage 
in mental rotations and girls’ advantage in verbal fluency, verbal episodic memory, and 
face recognition memory were not magnified during this age period, and were not 
modulated by pubertal maturation or levels of sex hormones.  
 
In Study II, we investigated whether the female own-gender bias in face recognition 
could be explained by women encoding female faces more elaborately than male faces. 
The results showed that divided attention at encoding, which may hamper elaborate 
encoding, did not reduce the magnitude of women’s own-gender bias, but attenuated 
women’s advantage over men in memory for female faces.   
 
Whether the gender of a face influenced men and women’s visual attention and 
memory for own- and other-race faces, and whether viewing time influenced the own-
race bias, was investigated in Study III. Women displayed an own-gender bias, 
irrespective of face ethnicity. More importantly, own-race female faces were viewed 
longer and were better recognized than other-race female faces, whereas these 
differences were smaller for male faces. However, differences in viewing time could 
not account for the magnified own-race bias found for female faces.  
 
The aim of Study IV was to assess whether women’s brain activity was higher for 
female than male faces in fusiform and inferior occipital gyri during incidental 
encoding of faces, and whether there was a relation between brain activity in fusiform 
gyri and the gender bias in face recognition. Results from this event-related fMRI study 
showed that women recognized more female than male faces, and that their brain 
activity during encoding was higher for female than for male faces in fusiform and 
inferior occipital gyri. Differential activity in left fusiform to female versus male faces 
was related to differences in memory for female and male faces.   
 
Taken together, the results of this thesis suggest that neither sex differences in cognitive 
abilities nor the female own-gender bias result from pubertal maturation or its 
associated changes in levels of sex hormones. Instead, the reasons for these differences 
should possibly be sought after earlier in development. With regard to the female own-
gender bias, results suggest that this effect is reliable, not affected by divided attention 
at encoding, associated with increased brain activation in regions specifically involved 
in face processing, and potentially a result of perceptual expertise.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
“The chief distinction in the intellectual powers of the two sexes is shewn [shown] by 
man attaining to a higher eminence, in whatever he takes up, than woman can attain - 
whether requiring deep thought, reason, or imagination, or merely the use of the senses 
and hands. If two lists were made of the most eminent men and women in poetry, 
painting, sculpture, music, - comprising composition and performance, history, science, 
and philosophy, with half-a-dozen names under each subject, the two lists would not 
bear comparison.” (Darwin, 1871, p. 327).  
 
 “The three main conclusions that the investigation seems to justify are as follows: 
1. The women excel the men noticeably in either immediate or delayed memory work.   
2. The men excel the women, but to a less degree, in reason work. 
3. Both sexes prefer memory work, but a greater relative number of men show a 
willingness to do reason work in lieu of memory work.” (Gates, 1917, p.146) 
 
The study of behavioral sex differences has a long history (e.g., Darwin, 1871), being 
controversial from the very beginning. Men were seen as more intelligent than women, 
as there were few – if any – acknowledged female geniuses in most areas of science 
and arts (Darwin, 1871; Lombroso, 1895). Darwin (1871) argued that men’s 
intellectual advantage was a result of part sexual selection, part natural selection. On 
the other hand, he did not consider that throughout ancient and modern times, women 
have not had access to higher education or more complex occupations, suggesting that 
the wealth of male geniuses was not reflecting true sex differences in intellectual 
abilities.  
 
With large-scale studies of intelligence, and as girls and women gained access to higher 
education, it was noted in the beginning of the 20th century that there were generally no 
sex differences in overall scores on intelligence tests (for a review, see Thompson 
Woolley, 1914). This is also the case today, but it should be noted that even though 
there are overall no sex differences on intelligence tests, there are sex differences on 
certain tests of specific cognitive abilities. In addition, the magnitudes and even the 
direction of cognitive sex differences are to some extent shaped by cultural factors – 
such as females’ access to education (e.g., Herlitz & Kabir, 2006; Hoffman, Gneezy, & 
List, 2011).  
 
Few research areas have been as questioned as the study of sex differences in cognitive 
abilities. Some have argued that the study of sex differences may be harmful, as these 
studies magnify differences between men and women instead of pointing out that there 
are no sex differences in a number of cognitive abilities, suggesting that women and 
men are more similar than they are different (Hyde, 2005). On the other hand, it has 
been argued that the study of cognitive sex differences is of interest in itself, as this 
may further our understanding of individual differences in these particular cognitive 
skills and how these abilities are organized (Kimura, 1999).  
 
Regardless of one’s opinion on the study of sex differences, there are numerous studies, 
conducted across different cohorts and cultures, showing that females excel on some 
cognitive tasks and males on others (e.g., de Frias, Nilsson, & Herlitz, 2006; Owen & 
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Lynn, 1993). It is not clear why there are cognitive sex differences, but there are plenty 
of hypotheses (e.g., Halpern, 2012; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). In the present thesis, I 
will address some of these hypotheses (Section 1.1), with a special focus on face 
recognition memory and the gender bias in memory for faces (Section 1.3).  
 
The magnitudes of cognitive sex differences range from small to large, much 
depending on the ability assessed. Magnitudes of differences are typically expressed in 
standard deviation units, Cohen’s d, which conventionally have been classified 
according to their size as small (|.20| ≤ d ≤ |.49|), medium (|.50| ≤ d ≤ |.79|), or large (d ≥ 
|.80|; Cohen, 1988). A small effect, such as d = 0.20, indicates that the overlap between 
the two performance distributions is approximately 85%; for a medium sized effect, d = 
0.50, the overlap is 67%, and for a large effect size, d = 0.80, 53% (Cohen, 1988). Note 
that a small effect size does not necessarily mean that it is unimportant or of less 
interest than a large effect size (for a discussion, see Prentice & Miller, 1992). 
Throughout the thesis, whenever an effect size of a sex difference is reported, a positive 
value refers to a female advantage, and a negative value indicates a male advantage. 
 
Finally, I would like to comment on my use of certain terms in this thesis. When 
referring to a difference in performance between males and females, I use the term sex, 
and when referring to whether a face is female or male, I use the term gender. I also use 
the term “own-gender bias” when referring to better memory for faces of one’s own sex 
compared to memory for faces of the other sex. Sex and gender have originally been 
used to mark whether one holds that differences found in performance between females 
and males are biologically based (sex) or socially based (gender), but no such meaning 
is inherent in my use of these terms. In a similar vein, I tend to use the terms race and 
ethnicity interchangeably throughout this thesis, even though these terms do not have 
the same meaning.       
 
1.1 SEX DIFFERENCES IN COGNITIVE ABILITIES 
Two of the most well-studied cognitive abilities typically showing sex differences are 
found in the verbal and the spatial domains. Another cognitive ability showing sex 
differences is episodic memory, and in particular memory for faces, which is a special 
focus of the present thesis. Before reviewing face recognition memory in Section 1.2, I 
will present an overview of sex differences in verbal abilities, spatial abilities, and in 
episodic memory for different materials.  
 
1.1.1 Verbal abilities 
Girls and women typically excel over boys and men in performance on some, but not 
all, verbal tasks. These tasks assess various forms of using and understanding language. 
Generally, a female advantage has been found on phonemic verbal fluency tasks, 
requiring a rapid generation of words beginning with a certain letter (e.g., “A”, d = .33; 
Hyde & Linn, 1988; see also Bolla, Lindgren, Bonaccorsy, & Bleecker, 1990; Herlitz, 
Airaksinen, & Nordström, 1999; Levin, Culhane, Hartmann, & Evankovich, 1991), 
whereas there are typically no sex differences on semantic fluency tasks, in which as 
many words within a category are to be generated (e.g., “animals”, Weiss et al., 2006; 
but see Halari et al., 2005). Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) suggested that boys and girls 
perform similarly on most verbal tasks, but after age 11, the sex difference becomes 
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intensified in for instance verbal production. In line with this notion, Levin et al. (1991) 
found that girls’ advantage on phonetic (henceforth referred to as verbal) fluency tasks 
was present between ages 9-15, but there was no sex difference between ages 7-8. 
Similarly, Sincoff and Sternberg (1988) found that girls’ advantage over boys in verbal 
fluency was larger in 11-year-olds than in 8-year-olds. The female advantage on verbal 
production tasks has been confirmed across various countries (e.g., Mann, Sasanuma, 
Sakuma, & Masaki, 1990). Finally, there are typically no sex differences on vocabulary 
tasks (e.g., Hyde & Linn, 1988; Levine, Huttenlocher, Taylor, & Langrock, 1999).  
 
1.1.2 Spatial abilities 
Males typically excel over females in tasks tapping spatial abilities (for meta-analyses, 
see Linn & Petersen, 1985; Voyer, Voyer, & Bryden, 1995). Spatial abilities have been 
separated into three subcomponents: spatial perception (rod and frame test, water level 
test), spatial visualization (e.g., block design, paper folding), and mental rotation (Linn 
& Petersen, 1985). Even though a male advantage has been found on spatial perception 
(d = -0.44), and a smaller advantage on spatial visualization tasks (d = -0.19), the 
largest sex difference is typically found on mental rotation tasks (d = -0.56; Voyer et 
al., 1995). In a typical mental rotation task, a target figure consisting of cubes is 
presented. Rotated versions of this figure are presented among other similar figures, 
and the goal is to determine which of the figures that is the same as the target. 
Assumedly, this type of task requires the ability to imagine how an object would look 
like if rotated in space.  
 
Some findings indicate that sex differences in spatial abilities emerge during puberty 
(e.g., Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; Voyer et al., 1995); others have found that the male 
advantage on spatial perception and mental rotation is present during early childhood 
(Levine et al., 1999; Linn & Petersen, 1985; Liu & Lynn, 2011). There are also studies 
that have used habituation paradigms to assess whether there are early sex differences 
in the ability to recognize a rotated object. In a typical habituation paradigm, the infant 
is familiarized with a material. To test recognition, the familiar material is paired with 
an unfamiliar material. If the infant prefers to view the novel compared to the familiar 
material, this is taken to indicate that the infant recognized the familiarized material. 
Interestingly, there were sex differences in viewing preferences, showing that 3- to 5-
month-old boys, but not girls, preferred to view novel objects compared to habituated 
but rotated objects (Moore & Johnson, 2008; Quinn & Liben, 2008). Finally, a male 
advantage on mental rotation tasks has been confirmed in a wide variety of cultural 
contexts (e.g., Janssen & Geiser, 2012; Mann et al., 1990; Owen & Lynn, 1993).  
 
1.1.3 Episodic memory 
Episodic memory refers to the ability to remember a personal experience (what), its 
occurrence in subjectively experienced time (when), and the place in which it occurred 
(where; Tulving, 2002). Episodic memory tasks comprise learning of a material and a 
memory test. The encoding can be either intentional (the participant is instructed that a 
memory test will follow) or incidental (a surprise memory test is completed). An 
unrelated task is usually performed between learning and the memory test to prevent 
repetition of the material. After this interval, which can last from a couple of minutes to 
days or months, a memory test is completed, which varies in difficulty depending on 
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the amount of support provided. The most difficult task is free recall, as no support is 
given. Cued recall gives some support; for instance, if word pairs are encoded, one 
word from each pair can be used as a cue for recall of the second word. Most support is 
given in recognition tasks, in which the old material is presented intermixed with a new 
material, and the task is to indicate whether each item is recognized or not.  
 
The direction and magnitude of sex differences in episodic memory depend largely on 
the type of material used (for a review, see Herlitz & Rehnman, 2008). Females often 
perform at a higher level than males when the material to be recalled or recognized is 
verbal (e.g., Herlitz, Nilsson, & Bäckman, 1997; Kramer, Delis, Kaplan, O'Donnell, & 
Prifitera, 1997), whereas a male advantage has been found for recall of visuospatial 
information, such as shading of a figure (Lewin, Wolgers, & Herlitz, 2001). Cross-
sectional studies of children, adolescents, and young adults have confirmed that the 
female advantage is present on verbal episodic memory tasks from at least age 5 (e.g., 
Gur et al., 2012; Keith, Reynolds, Roberts, Winter, & Austin, 2011; Lowe, Mayfield, & 
Reynolds, 2003) and into old age (90 years, de Frias et al., 2006; 70-100 years, 
Gerstorf, Herlitz, & Smith, 2006). Interestingly, women also show an advantage in 
memory for object locations (for a review and meta-analysis, see Voyer, Postma, 
Brake, & Imperato-McGinley, 2007), which is somewhat surprising given that the 
nature of this task is arguably more spatial. Moreover, women excel over men in odor 
recognition memory (Larsson, Lövdén, & Nilsson, 2003; see also Choudhury, Moberg, 
& Doty, 2003; Doty & Kerr, 2005). Girls and women also perform at a higher level 
than boys and men on face recognition memory tasks (e.g., Bengner et al., 2006; Gur et 
al., 2012; Rehnman & Herlitz, 2006; Rehnman & Herlitz, 2007). The sex difference in 
memory for faces is a special focus of this dissertation and is reviewed in depth in 
Section 1.3.  
 
1.1.4 A comment: Cultural influences 
Even though I have stated that sex differences in some abilities are well established, as 
they have been replicated across different samples, ages, and countries, it should be 
noted that some of these group differences may depend on the degree of gender 
equality in the society (as assessed by girls’ and women’s access to education, more 
qualified occupations, childcare opportunities, etc.). Herlitz and Kabir (2006) compared 
sex differences on subtasks of the Mini-Mental State Examination in samples of 
illiterate and literate Bangladeshi participants and Swedish participants. What is 
striking with this study is that women performed less well than men in the illiterate 
Bangladeshi group on almost all tasks, and there was no sex difference in free recall. 
However, in the literate Bangladeshis group, sex differences favored men and women 
as seen in many Western societies. Another example comes from a cross-sectional 
study of boys and girls between ages 5-16 in Colombia and Mexico (Ardila, Rosselli, 
Matute, & Inozemtseva, 2011). Even though there was a male advantage on one of the 
spatial tasks, boys’ performance was higher than girls’ in language comprehension and 
there was no sex difference in recall of words or figures. Yet another example comes 
from the PISA study, investigating 15-year-old students’ math and reading abilities in 
more than 40 countries (Guiso, Monte, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008). Boys’ advantage 
over girls in math was very small or non-existent in countries with higher gender 
equality, whereas girls’ advantage over boys in reading remained and became larger in 
countries with higher gender equality. These studies indicate that education, culture, 
and/or gender equality modulate the magnitude of cognitive sex differences.  
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1.1.5 Explanations of sex differences in cognitive abilities 
Broadly speaking, explanations of cognitive sex differences can be separated into two 
main areas – social and biological. Social explanations generally assume that most 
behavioral sex differences are a result of differential socialization of females and males 
(e.g., Bem, 1983), which for instance could influence their play preferences in 
childhood, later educational and occupational choices, and in turn cognitive sex 
differences. In contrast, biological explanations share the notion that biological 
differences, such as in levels of sex hormones and in turn, their influence on the brain, 
may contribute to behavioral sex differences (e.g., Berenbaum & Beltz, 2011; 
Hampson, 1995). This perspective typically holds that individual experience and 
evolution shape these differences (Kimura, 1999). However, it should be noted than no 
clear separation between biology and culture/environment can be made, as any given 
biological influence on cognitive abilities must be developed through interactions 
between the individual and the environment, and the environment can affect the 
expression of genes (Gottlieb, 1998).  
 
Explanations of cognitive sex differences can be separated based on their level of 
explanation. The social explanations mentioned earlier concern societal and parental 
influences. Some biological explanations are mainly occupied with hemispheric 
organization of the brain or regional brain volumes, others with hormonal and/or 
genetic influences on the organization of the brain and neural signaling during different 
stages of development. Even though focus may be put on different levels, most 
biological explanations eventually arrive at the genetic and/or the cellular level (e.g., 
Geschwind & Galaburda, 1985a-c; Hines, 2010). To illustrate this hierarchy of 
explanation levels, I will start off with a discussion of a common approach to explain 
sex differences in episodic memory. This will be followed by a summary of two 
explanations of importance for the present thesis, which focus on puberty and the 
relation between endogenous sex hormones and individual differences in cognitive 
performance.  
 
1.1.5.1 Explaining sex differences with sex differences  
To better understand why a sex difference may be found in a particular cognitive 
ability, it has been of interest to assess whether sex differences in a certain cognitive 
ability may drive another. For instance, as performance on many episodic memory 
tasks can be improved by verbalization of the material during encoding, it has been 
suggested that women’s higher skill in verbal processing or verbal production may 
explain sex differences favoring women in odor memory (Larsson et al., 2003), face 
recognition memory (Lewin & Herlitz, 2002), object location memory (Lejbak, 
Vrbancic, & Crossley, 2009), memory for activities (Herlitz et al., 1997), free recall and 
recognition of common objects (Herlitz et al., 1999) and words (Herlitz et al., 1999; 
Herlitz et al., 1997; Larsson et al., 2003). Interestingly, women’s advantage over men 
remained on all episodic memory tasks mentioned above when verbal processing skills 
were controlled for – apart from two: women’s advantage in memory for odors and 
verbal episodic memory (Herlitz et al., 1999; Larsson et al., 2003; but see also Herlitz 
et al., 1997). Similarly, as women typically perform better than men on tasks assessing 
memory for words, odors, faces, objects, and object locations, it has been suggested 
 6 
that women have a slight general advantage in episodic memory compared to men 
(Herlitz & Rehnman, 2008). However, when explaining one sex difference by another, 
the issue remains - why do we observe a sex difference in the first place?  
 
1.1.5.2 Sex hormones – sex differences? 
There are several biological explanations of cognitive sex differences (for reviews, see 
Collaer & Hines, 1995; Halpern, 2012; Hines, 2004). Most of these hold, in one way or 
another, that sex hormones influence the organization of the brain, and in turn, 
behavior. It is beyond the scope of the present thesis to review them all. Here, I will 
focus on studies of sex hormones and pubertal development in humans, and the 
following two hypotheses: (1) onset of puberty magnifies cognitive sex differences 
(e.g., Voyer et al., 1995), and (2) individual differences in endogenous levels of sex 
hormones influence cognitive abilities (e.g., Kimura & Hampson, 1994; Nyborg, 1983). 
Many of these ideas originate from experimental animal work, showing that 
manipulated levels of sex steroids during prenatal and the pubertal phases of 
development organize the brain, social and sexual behaviors, and performance on 
various cognitive tasks (for a review, see Sisk & Zehr, 2005). Before reviewing the role 
of puberty and sex hormones in cognitive sex differences, I will provide a brief 
overview of physical development during puberty. 
 
The prepubertal stage, adrenarche, typically begins between ages 6-9 in girls and 
approximately one year later in boys with an increase of adrenal androgen production, 
but this surge of weak androgens (e.g., dehydroepiandrosterone – DHEA) occurs 
without changes in secondary sex characteristics (e.g., Cameron, 2004). The second 
stage of pubertal development, gonadarche, begins approximately two years after 
adrenarche and is initiated by the activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal axis 
(Reiter & Grumbach, 1982). Increased production of gonadotropin releasing hormone 
in the hypothalamic neurons stimulates the production of luteinizing hormone and 
follicle-stimulating hormone in the pituitary, which initiates the production of sex 
hormones in the gonads – androgens (e.g., testosterone [T]) and estrogens (e.g., 
estradiol [E2], progesterone). Thus, the primary sexual characteristics mature (ovaries, 
testes) during gonadarche and the secondary sex characteristics become fully developed 
(e.g., pubic hair, breasts, genitals) as a result of the increased levels of endogenous sex 
hormones. The final stage of puberty is the onset of menses (menarche) for girls, and 
the onset of emissions for boys (spermarche; Dorn, Dahl, Woodward, & Biro, 2006). 
After puberty and during the major part of adulthood, levels of sex hormones differ 
markedly between men and women, even though the “male” androgens and the 
“female” estrogens are present in both sexes.  
 
As males and females’ exposure to endogenous sex hormones differ throughout the life 
span, it has been of interest to determine whether cognitive sex differences may be 
explained by these hormonal sex differences. Broadly speaking, there are two routes by 
which hormones are thought to influence the brain, and in turn behavior. Based on their 
work on guinea pigs, Phoenix, Goy, Gerall, and Young (1959, as reviewed in Wallen, 
2009) proposed that prenatal levels of testosterone influence the expression of sex-
specific mating behaviors in adult animals. The effects of sex hormones were separated 
into organizational effects occurring early, having a permanent effect on the brain, and 
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activational effects occurring later in development, which are short-term hormonal 
influences acting on existing neural systems (for an overview, see Goy & McEwen, 
2007). Even though sex differences in prenatal and early postnatal exposure to T are 
two periods of particular interest for assessing potential organizational effects (e.g., 
Hines, 2010), puberty has been proposed as an additional important period (Sisk & 
Zehr, 2005). Gonadal steroids have been shown to affect numerous neuronal processes, 
for instance the formation and elimination of synapses, cell birth, cell death, and 
neurotransmitter receptor expression, and there are plenty of androgen and estrogen 
receptors distributed in other brain areas than hypothalamus (for a review, see 
Cameron, 2004). In addition, these hormones have been shown to act on brain regions 
involved in cognitive functions, including hippocampus, amygdala, and striatum (for a 
review, see Gillies & McArthur, 2010). For instance, animal studies have shown that 
estrogen interacts with dopamine transmission in the striatum (Becker, 1999), and there 
are findings indicating that in humans, genetic markers of COMT enzyme activity in 
the prefrontal cortex interact with the natural fluctuation of estrogen during the 
menstrual cycle, influencing spatial working memory performance as well as prefrontal 
brain activity while performing the task (Jacobs & D'Esposito, 2011).  
 
1.1.5.3 Puberty and sex differences in cognitive abilities  
Waber (1976, 1977) proposed maturation rate to be important for the development of 
cognitive functions, and suggested that sex differences in certain abilities (verbal, 
spatial) are a result of most girls maturing earlier than boys, with differential 
lateralization of the brain as the proposed mechanism. Waber suggested that earlier 
maturing individuals may be less lateralized during verbal (speech) processing than 
later maturers, which would improve early maturers’ performance on verbal tasks, 
whereas their bilateral lateralization would interfere with spatial processing. Thus, later 
maturing individuals would tend to be more lateralized than earlier maturing 
individuals, in turn facilitating performance on spatial tasks compared to verbal task 
performance. Generally, there has not been consistent support for the idea that early 
maturing individuals have an advantage on verbal compared to spatial tasks, or the 
reversed pattern for later maturers (for a review and meta-analysis, see Newcombe & 
Dubas, 1987).  
 
Another suggestion is that sex differences in cognitive abilities, particularly in spatial 
abilities but also in verbal abilities, are first observed or magnified during puberty 
(Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; McGee, 1979; Voyer et al., 1995), which may suggest a 
role of pubertal sex hormones. Similarly, as studies of rodents indicate that sex 
hormones during puberty organize behavior in a sex-dependent manner, it has been 
suggested that pubertal hormones may also organize cognitive functions in humans 
(Sisk & Zehr, 2005). The increased levels of sex hormones during puberty may 
influence signaling in and/or development of task-relevant brain regions, particularly if 
these regions contain androgen or estrogen receptors. As an example, it has been shown 
that in 12-year-old girls and 13-year-old-boys, sex differences in gray matter volume in 
some regions of the medial temporal lobe (right hippocampus, amygdala) were larger 
for individuals with more advanced puberty and higher levels of testosterone (Bramen 
et al., 2011). At present, there are some studies, reviews, and meta-analyses suggesting 
that sex differences in verbal fluency and mental rotations are smaller before puberty 
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than after (e.g., Levin et al., 1991; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; Voyer et al., 1995). On 
the other hand, there are findings indicating that sex differences on these tasks are 
found well before puberty (Levine et al., 1999; Sincoff & Sternberg, 1988). 
 
In sum, sex differences in cognitive abilities seem to be present early, especially in 
verbal episodic memory and mental rotations, but it is not clear whether these sex 
differences indeed are magnified during puberty or not. In Study I, we tested whether 
cognitive sex differences became larger throughout ages 12-14, and whether sex 
differences were larger between individuals with higher levels of sex hormones 
(indicating more advanced puberty) or more advanced puberty (as indicated by self-
ratings of pubertal development).  
 
1.1.5.4 Endogenous sex hormone levels and cognitive performance  
In humans, the relation between sex hormones and cognition is typically assessed by 
studying inter- or intra-individual differences in levels of endogenous sex hormones. 
Another approach, albeit less common, is to investigate effects of 
administration/suppression of endogenous sex hormones on cognitive performance.  
 
There are various hypotheses regarding the relation between sex hormones and 
performance on different cognitive tasks (for an overview of sex hormones and spatial 
abilities, see Davison & Susman, 2001). For instance, it has been suggested that there is 
a range of hormone levels that gives an optimal performance on spatial tasks. As 
androgens can be aromatized to estradiol, Nyborg (1983) proposed that females have 
more than optimal levels of estradiol for spatial performance, and males lower than 
optimal levels. Thus, a positive relation between levels of estradiol and spatial 
performance would be expected for males, and a negative relation for females. Overall, 
there are few studies showing a relation between levels of estradiol and performance on 
spatial tasks, as a positive relation has been observed for women, but no relation for 
men (Janowsky, Chavez, Zamboni, & Orwoll, 1998), and a positive relation for boys 
aged 10-14 years but no relation for girls aged 9-14 years (Davison & Susman, 2001). 
Similarly, a non-linear relation between T and spatial performance has been proposed, 
which has received some support (Gouchie & Kimura, 1991; but see Halari et al., 
2005).  
 
Moreover, there are variations of this idea, holding that the relation between levels of 
testosterone and spatial performance is linear (see Davison & Susman, 2001). Indeed, 
there are findings of a positive relation between levels of testosterone and performance 
on spatial tasks in boys and men (Burkitt, Widman, & Saucier, 2007; Davison & 
Susman, 2001; Hassler, 1992; Hooven, Chabris, Ellison, & Kosslyn, 2004; Silverman, 
Kastuk, Choi, & Phillips, 1999; Thilers, MacDonald, & Herlitz, 2006), but there are 
also studies reporting a negative relation (Moffat & Hampson, 1996) or no relations for 
men or boys (Halari et al., 2005; Hassler, 1992; Hassler, Gupta, & Wollmann, 1992; 
Janowsky et al., 1998; Kampen & Sherwin, 1996; Puts et al., 2010; Yonker, Eriksson, 
Nilsson, & Herlitz, 2006). For females, there are studies showing a positive (Moffat & 
Hampson, 1996) or no relation between levels of testosterone and spatial performance 
(Davison & Susman, 2001; Halari et al., 2005; Hassler, 1992; Hassler et al., 1992; 
Janowsky et al., 1998; Puts et al., 2010).  
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For verbal fluency, no consistent relations have been found between performance and 
levels of estradiol or testosterone for either women or men (Christiansen & 
Knussmann, 1987; Halari et al., 2005; Hassler et al., 1992; Janowsky et al., 1998; 
Moffat & Hampson, 1996; Thilers et al., 2006).  
 
There are few studies of the relation between individual differences in episodic memory 
performance and sex hormone levels in children, adolescents, or young adults. Most 
studies have assessed these relations in perimenopausal and/or postmenopausal women, 
mainly with regard to effects of hormone replacement therapy, and in elderly adults 
(but see Janowsky et al., 1998). As for the findings reported above for performance on 
spatial tasks and verbal fluency, there are studies showing a positive relation 
(Hogervorst, De Jager, Budge, & Smith, 2004; Wolf & Kirschbaum, 2002), a negative 
relation (Tuomisto, Salo, Saarinen, Kalleinen, & Polo-Kantola, 2012), or no relation 
(Luetters et al., 2007) between verbal episodic memory and estradiol levels in middle-
aged and/or older women and men. Few studies have shown a relation between 
testosterone and verbal episodic memory performance in elderly men (for a review, see 
Warren, Serby, & Roane, 2008). 
 
Taken together, the support for a relation between endogenous sex hormone levels and 
cognitive performance across individuals is mixed. There are findings showing 
positive, negative, and no associations between sex hormones and cognitive 
performance, although most studies have assessed spatial abilities, and particularly 
mental rotations. Moreover, there are few studies on young adolescents, as most studies 
on the relation between sex hormones and cognitive performance are based on adults. 
In Study I, potential relations between individual differences in sex hormones and 
performance on cognitive tests typically yielding sex differences were assessed in a 
sample of young adolescents (ages 12-14). 
 
1.2 FACE RECOGNITION 
Faces are a very important type of social stimulus for many species, particularly for 
primates, but also for other mammals with complex social structures (for a review, see 
Leopold & Rhodes, 2010). For humans, faces are the most important social stimulus 
there is, as face-to-face communication from birth is the first and the major manner in 
which we socially communicate with each other. Faces provide a rich source of 
information, which can be separated into two major components: face traits and face 
states (e.g., Pascalis et al., 2011). Face traits are the stable characteristics of a face, such 
as species, sex, age, ethnicity, aesthetics (attractivity), and the individual’s identity. 
Face states are the dynamic facial movements expressed by the individual, such as 
speech, emotion, and direction of gaze.  
 
Another important distinction between facial information that has been made is 
between configural (the spatial relation between facial features) and featural 
information (eyes, nose, mouth, hair, jawline; Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002). 
Compared to other objects, faces seem to be processed in a more configural or holistic 
manner, that is, recognition of faces is based on their configurations of features rather 
than on their individual features (for a review, see Maurer et al., 2002); I will return to 
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this topic in the next section. Various models have been put forward to describe the 
process of recognizing a familiar face. Common for these models is that there are 
multiple stages, beginning with that the face is encoded, then matched with a stored 
representation of the face, its associated semantic information, and finally, the name 
may be recalled (e.g., Bruce & Young, 1986). Valentine (1991) proposed a 
multidimensional space model, suggesting that unfamiliar faces are encoded as vectors 
in this space, in relation to their deviation from a norm face (an “average” face 
representation). This means that typical faces would be distributed close to the origin, 
and distinctive faces would be located further away from the origin.  
 
Throughout this thesis, I use the terms face recognition and face recognition memory 
interchangeably when referring to studies assessing memory for faces using episodic 
memory tasks (e.g., yes/no recognition tests, longer interval between encoding and test, 
e.g., 5-10 minutes). Other types of tasks assessing other aspects of face processing are 
also sometimes referred to as recognition tasks in the literature, such as tasks assessing 
identification of emotional expressions. This has lead to misinterpretations of results, 
for instance that women’s advantage over men in memory for faces could be explained 
by women’s advantage in emotion identification (Halpern, 2012). Therefore, I refer to 
face recognition tasks that have a very short interval between each target and test face 
(a few ms or sec) as face identification or discrimination tasks, as these are not tests of 
episodic memory for faces. Finally, I would also like to highlight that most studies I 
refer to used “neutral” faces, that is, faces that do not express any particular emotion, 
and I will explicitly state when faces displaying emotional expressions were used.  
 
1.2.1 Is face processing special? 
There is plenty of evidence supporting the notion that face processing is functionally 
separated from processing of other objects. Patients with acquired prosopagnosia (“face 
blindness”) have typically neural damage in either bilateral or right ventral temporal 
and/or occipital cortex, resulting in impaired face recognition (e.g., Farah, Rabinowitz, 
Quinn, & Liu, 2000). Importantly, patients with prosopagnosia do not necessarily show 
impaired recognition of other objects, and some patients with object agnosia can 
recognize faces (e.g., Moscovitch, Winocur, & Behrmann, 1997). Studies using various 
brain imaging methods, such as positron emission tomography (PET) and functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), have confirmed that some areas of the brain are 
specifically involved in face processing. FMRI of blood oxygen level-dependent 
(BOLD) responses measures indirectly neural responses in various brain regions during 
performance of cognitive tasks. There are now plenty of studies in adults that have 
confirmed that faces compared to other objects consistently activate specific regions 
within especially the fusiform (FFG) and inferior occipital gyri (IOG; Haxby et al., 
1996; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Kanwisher & Yovel, 2006).   
 
Haxby, Hoffman, and Gobbini (2000) suggested that the core system for face 
processing comprised the following areas: the occipital face area (OFA), located in the 
mid/inferior occipital cortex (IOG), involved in the early visual analysis of face parts 
(for a review, see Pitcher, Walsh, & Duchaine, 2011); the fusiform face area (FFA), 
located in the FFG, engaged in individuation or holistic processing of faces (Rhodes, 
Byatt, Michie, & Puce, 2004; Schiltz, Dricot, Goebel, & Rossion, 2010); the superior 
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temporal sulcus (STS), mainly involved in processing of facial movement, such as 
mouth movement (Pelphrey, Morris, Michelich, Allison, & McCarthy, 2005). Studies 
assessing functional and effective connectivity between these core regions have 
generally confirmed that this is a reasonable neural model of the face processing 
network (Cohen Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh, Dick, & Johnson, 2011; Fairhall & Ishai, 
2007). The selectivity of FFA and other regions for faces compared to other objects has 
typically been operationalized as the number of activated voxels and/or the average 
blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) response in the whole ROI and/or the 
magnitude of peak voxel response in this ROI to faces compared to common objects 
(e.g., Furl, Garrido, Dolan, Driver, & Duchaine, 2011; Kanwisher et al., 1997).  
 
In addition to the core system, Haxby et al. (2000) proposed an extended system that 
includes among other regions the amygdala, insula, the limbic system (processing of 
facial expressions), and the anterior temporal lobe (processing of semantic information 
related to the individual). However, there are different views on which regions to 
include in the extended network. As an example, Ishai (2008) included the amygdala, 
orbitofrontal cortex, and the inferior frontal gyrus.  
 
There are several behavioral findings indicating that faces are processed differently 
from other objects. To begin with, face identification and recognition is 
disproportionally impaired by inversion (the “inversion effect”; Yin, 1969). Thus, if 
faces are presented up-side down, encoding and recognition becomes more difficult, 
whereas encoding and recognition of other types of stimuli, such as houses or 
landscapes, are not as sensitive to inversion. Moreover, the importance of configural 
processing in face identification has been shown by a paradigm that use composite 
faces. If the top half of a face is combined with the lower half of another individual’s 
face, this composite face is typically perceived as a new individual, and identification 
of the individual depicted in the top half is slower and less accurate when the two 
halves are aligned compared to when they are misaligned horizontally (the “composite 
effect”; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). In addition, facial features are better 
identified when presented in a face than when presented in isolation (the “part-whole 
effect”; Tanaka & Farah, 1993), and changes to the facial configuration impair memory 
for facial features (Tanaka & Sengco, 1997). Thus, human faces seem to be 
preferentially processed as wholes, and manipulations that interfere with holistic 
processing typically impair face identification and recognition, but not recognition of 
other types of objects.  
 
Another line of evidence comes from studies of infants’ and children’s face perception 
and recognition. Newborn infants preferentially attend to face-like configurations 
compared to random configurations of facial parts (for a review, see Johnson, 2005). 
However, there are also many findings suggesting that experiences shape facial 
preferences during infancy. For example, a few days after birth, infants prefer to attend 
to their mother’s face compared an unfamiliar female adult (Bushnell, Sai, & Mullin, 
1989). Three-month-old infants are typically exposed to more female than male faces 
(Rennels & Davis, 2008), and mother-reared infants prefer to look at a novel female 
over a novel male face, whereas infants who primarily had been raised by their father 
prefer male compared to female faces (Quinn, Yahr, Kuhn, Slater, & Pascalis, 2002). 
Similarly, Chinese and Caucasian infants prefer to look at own-race compared to other-
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race faces (Kelly et al., 2005; Kelly et al., 2007). In addition, there are findings 
indicating a sensitive period for learning faces of different species and ethnicities in 
infancy. Pascalis, de Haan and Nelson (2002) found that 6-month-old infants could 
discriminate between previously seen and novel monkey faces. Moreover, children who 
had had experience with monkey faces during ages 6-9 months could recognize 
monkey faces when they were 9 months old, whereas no novelty preferences were 
found for children without previous experience (Pascalis et al., 2005). Similarly, infants 
aged 8-10 months who received brief daily other-race face experience during three 
weeks could discriminate between other-race faces after this period (Anzures et al., 
2012). These findings indicate that even though infants initially show a preference for 
facial configurations, early visual preferences and the ability to discriminate between 
faces are shaped by the infants’ experiences.  
 
Throughout childhood and adolescence, face recognition memory improves steadily 
(e.g., Gur et al., 2012), and from about age 5, children show holistic processing of faces 
(Crookes & McKone, 2009; Tanaka, Kay, Grinnell, Stansfield, & Szechter, 1998). 
However, the preferential BOLD response in FFG to faces seems to emerge later. 
Findings from fMRI studies indicate that 5- to 8-year-old children do not show 
specificity in FFG for faces compared to other objects as older children and adults do 
(Scherf, Behrmann, Humphreys, & Luna, 2007). The activated volume of the right FFA 
has been shown to be larger in adults than in children (Golarai et al., 2007), and in 
adults compared to adolescents (Golarai, Liberman, Yoon, & Grill-Spector, 2010). 
Moreover, children do not show a similar strength in effective connectivity between 
FFG, IOG, and STS as adults do in response to different task demands during face 
processing (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2011).  
 
It is generally agreed upon that adults are face experts and experience shapes the ability 
to process faces, but there are different views on how this special ability develops (for a 
review, see Pascalis et al., 2011): either from an innate specialized face-processing 
mechanism (the modularity hypothesis; Kanwisher, 2000) or from the extreme amount 
of exposure to faces (a general learning effect; Nelson, 2001). The modularity 
hypothesis suggests that humans are born with a special neural module that is 
specifically dedicated to face processing, and to face processing only. This idea is 
supported by animal work, showing that even if no early facial experience was 
provided during the first 6-24 months, Japanese macaques showed a visual preference 
for both human and monkey faces to non-face objects, and could discriminate between 
new and old faces (Sugita, 2008).  
 
However, there are many findings suggesting that faces may rather be a category of 
objects that we have a large amount of experience with, and in turn, regions of the core 
system “dedicated” to faces may also be activated by objects-of-expertise. This has 
been supported by studies on expertise with non-face materials, such as chess experts 
(e.g., Bilalić, Langner, Ulrich, & Grodd, 2011; Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & 
Anderson, 2000), as well as training studies using an artificial species (Gauthier & Tarr, 
1997, 2002). There are also behavioral findings suggesting that processing of objects-
of-expertise to some extent resembles face processing, as inversion effects are also 
found for experts on their objects-of-expertise (e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986).  
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A middle-way view on the development of face processing is the interactive 
specialization theory, which holds that infants are born with a predisposition to attend 
specifically to face configurations (for a review of this framework, see Johnson, 2011). 
This is accomplished by a subcortical route consisting of the amygdala, pulvinar, and 
superior colliculus, activated by low spatial frequency information in faces. This 
information comes mainly from the facial configuration. In turn, faces filtered to 
contain a range of low spatial frequencies look coarse and blurred (for an example, see 
Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2003).    
 
The idea is that the subcortical route is activated when faces are detected, especially in 
the periphery of vision, which would enable infants to orient their gaze towards objects 
(i.e., faces with a direct view) appropriate for social interaction. Moreover, this route 
assumedly projects onto cortical areas, which may put anatomical and functional 
constraints on particular areas (the core face network) that increasingly become tuned 
to faces throughout development. In short, this theory has great appeal as it can explain 
a large part of empirical findings, including the orienting response to faces observed in 
newborn infants (Johnson, 2011).  
 
1.3 INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN FACE RECOGNITION 
Even though I earlier alluded to that all adults are experts in face processing, this is 
naturally an oversimplification. Patients with developmental prosopagnosia have great 
difficulties in recognizing faces, even faces belonging to highly familiar persons, but no 
known brain lesions. Some have argued that developmental prosopagnosia may be seen 
as the lower end of a continuum of the ability to recognize and discriminate between 
faces (Furl et al., 2011). In turn, BOLD responses in FFA may be linked to individual 
differences in face recognition memory performance, that is, degree of face-related 
activation in this brain region may be related to performance on face memory tasks. 
Furl and colleagues (2011) found that a higher BOLD response in FFA predicted better 
performance on face recognition tasks in a sample of patients with developmental 
prosopagnosics and controls. In a similar vein, at the higher end of the distribution of 
skills in face processing and recognition are individuals who seem unable to ever forget 
a face - “super-recognizers” (Russell, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2009). Russell et al. 
(2009) assessed the performance of three women and one man, reporting that they were 
exceptionally good at recognizing others. These “super-recognizers” performed well 
above the range of controls on face memory tasks, as well as on a perceptual face 
discrimination task, and interestingly, showed a larger face inversion effect than 
controls. Controls, in turn, showed a larger face inversion effect than patients with 
developmental prosopagnosia (Russell et al., 2009). Other studies of individual 
differences in face recognition have, for instance, shown that individuals classified as 
high in empathy or extraversion remember more faces than individuals categorized as 
low in empathy or extraversion (e.g., Bate, Parris, Haslam, & Kay, 2010; Li et al., 
2010). However, one basic difference is typically found between females and males – 
females typically perform higher than males on face processing and recognition 
memory tasks.  
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1.3.1 Sex differences in face perception  
To begin with, sex differences in infants’ attention to faces have been observed. In a 
sample of newborn infants, who were approximately 37 hours old, girls attended more 
to a female face than young infant boys, whereas boys attended more to a mechanical 
object (i.e., a moving mobile; Connellan, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Batki, & 
Ahluwalia, 2000). As eye-to-eye contact is one of the earliest social behaviors that 
infants engage in and is under the infant’s own control, it is also interesting that sex 
differences have been found in this behavior. Hittelman and Dickes (1979) found that 
24-60 hour old girls engaged in longer eye-to-eye contact with a female interactor than 
boys, although Leeb and Rejskind (2004) failed to replicate this finding in a sample of 
infants aged 13-112 hours. Nevertheless, the latter study showed that at age 3.5 months, 
girls engaged to a much higher extent than boys in mutual eye contact with an 
interactor, especially with the female interactor. Even though infant girls showed a 
large increase in mutual eye-contact with the interactors from the first to the second 
testing occasion, boys did not show an increase in amount of eye-contact with the 
interactors. Others have also shown that females in early and late infancy, childhood, 
and adulthood engage in mutual eye-contact to a higher extent than males, and 
particularly when the interactor is female (Ashear & Snortum, 1971; Exline, 1963; 
Exline, Gray, & Schuette, 1965; Field, Cohen, Garcia, & Greenberg, 1984; Levine & 
Sutton-Smith, 1973; Osofsky & O’Connell, 1977). In line with this, women have been 
found to attend more to the eyes than men when viewing faces, as shown by a higher 
number of fixations and a longer dwell time in the eye region (Hall, Hutton, & Morgan, 
2010; Sæther, Van Belle, Laeng, Brennen, & Øvervoll, 2009). 
 
It is not clear if there are early sex differences in face perception. For 2.5-4.9 year old 
children, Burns and Reynolds (1988) found that the magnitude of girls’ advantage over 
boys in face identification was d = 0.32, and this difference remained when general 
intelligence was accounted for. However, results from a study by Picozzi, Macchi 
Cassia, Turati, and Vescovo (2009) indicated that 3- and 4-year-old girls and boys 
performed at a similar level, whereas 5-year-old girls seemed to perform at a higher 
level than 5-year-old boys in identification of female faces. Similarly, Ge and 
colleagues (2008) found that 4-, 8-, and 14-year-old girls were better at identifying their 
peers compared to boys when identification was based on facial features (i.e., nose, 
eyes, mouth), although girls’ advantage over boys appeared to be larger for female than 
male faces.  
 
For adults, there is some evidence of a sex differences in detection of faces, as women 
were more accurate and faster in identification of upright male face contours, slightly 
better than men and faster in the identification of inverted male face contours, and there 
was no sex difference in identification of tree contours (McBain, Norton, & Chen, 
2009). Moreover, Godard and Fiori (2010) assessed sex differences in adults’ 
identification of bisymmetric faces (a left and a right face half) and hemi-faces (left or 
right face half). The hemi-faces were presented either in the left or the right visual field. 
A target bisymmetric or hemi-face was presented shortly, and after a short ISI, a 
bisymmetric face either matching the face seen previously or a new face was presented 
and participants decided whether the face was the same as the one seen previously or 
not. They found that men were more accurate when the hemi-face was presented in the 
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left visual field, whereas women performed equally well for hemi-faces presented in 
either hemisphere. Even though there was no sex difference in accuracy, women 
responded faster than men (Godard & Fiori, 2010). In a more recent study, Godard and 
Fiori (2012) assessed discrimination of faces. Here, the probe face displayed different 
emotional expressions at the initial presentation, but a neutral expression during 
identification. There was no sex difference in performance when the probe displayed a 
neutral expression, that is, when the probe and the target were exactly the same. 
However, when the probe displayed an emotional expression, women were more 
accurate at identifying the neutral target than men were.  
 
Megreya, Bindemann, and Havard (2011) investigated potential sex differences in 
matching of unfamiliar faces (same/different identity judgments). They found that 
women were more accurate when matching female faces, and performed better than 
men on mismatch trials. Finally, Cellerino, Borghetti, and Sartucci (2004) used 
Gaussian noise filters to assess the effect of reduced perceptual information on face 
gender categorization. They found that women identified female faces more accurately 
than men when picture quality was reduced, although it should be noted that male faces 
were generally more accurately classified as “male” than female faces were classified 
as “female”. Taken together, these findings indicate that women perform at a higher 
level and faster than men on face detection tasks, and on face discrimination tasks, 
which typically assess immediate identification of briefly displayed faces (e.g., 120 
ms), following short ISIs (e.g., 1120 ms; Godard & Fiori, 2012).  
 
1.3.2 Sex differences in face recognition 
Sex differences in face recognition memory have been noted from age 6 and up (e.g., 
Cross, Cross, & Daly, 1971; Ellis, Shepherd, & Bruce, 1973; Feiman & Entwisle, 
1976), and a recent large cross-sectional study of children, adolescents, and young 
adults (ages 8-21) showed a female advantage, which was not moderated by age (Gur et 
al., 2012). The sex difference in face recognition memory is also found in younger 
(Bengner et al., 2006; Chance & Goldstein, 1979; Herlitz & Yonker, 2002), middle-
aged, and older adults (Herlitz et al., 1997). It is less clear if sex differences are present 
during infancy and early childhood. Even though few studies seem to have assessed sex 
differences in infants’ recognition of faces, there are some findings indicating that 5-6 
month old girls were better than boys at discriminating between upright faces, but not 
inverted faces (Fagan, 1972, Experiment 3, 5). However, these findings were not 
replicated in a later study (Fagan, 1973), and another study found that 3-month-old 
boys, but not girls, recognized a female face, but there was no difference between 6-
month-old girls and boys (Pascalis, de Haan, Nelson, & de Schonen, 1998). 
 
There is some evidence of sex differences in BOLD responses during face processing, 
with men showing higher prefrontal activity than women (Fine, Semrud-Clikeman, & 
Zhu, 2009; Fischer, Sandblom, Nyberg, Herlitz, & Bäckman, 2007; Ino, Nakai, Azuma, 
Kimura, & Fukuyama, 2010; but see also Haut & Barch, 2006; Sergerie, Lepage, & 
Armony, 2006). It should be noted that most of these studies used neutral and 
emotional faces (Fine et al., 2009; Fischer et al., 2007; Ino et al., 2010). It has also been 
observed that men had a higher BOLD response in FFG or FFA than women (Ino et al., 
2010; Mather, Lighthall, Nga, & Gorlick, 2010). On the other hand, girls and women 
 16 
seem to show higher face specificity in FFG than boys and men, as evidenced by a 
larger volume of activated voxels in the fusiform region in response to faces (Golarai et 
al., 2010; Tahmasebi et al., 2012). Finally, studies assessing event-related potentials in 
response to faces have indicated that men show a more right-lateralized response over 
the occipito-temporal cortex than women, who show a bilateral response pattern 
(Proverbio, Brignone, Matarazzo, Del Zotto, & Zani, 2006; Proverbio, Riva, Martin, & 
Zani, 2010). This is in line with the behavioral findings discussed previously, indicating 
that men are better at processing faces presented to the left visual field than the right 
visual field (Godard & Fiori, 2010).  
 
1.3.3 Women’s advantage – an own-group bias? 
Several studies show that face gender influences the magnitude of the sex difference in 
memory for faces. One of the first studies assessing the own-gender bias in children 
and adults’ recognition memory for faces nicely illustrates the general performance 
pattern observed in more recent studies, as females recognized more female than male 
faces, whereas males did not display an own-gender bias (Sugisaki & Brown, 1916). 
Women’s own-gender bias has been replicated in many studies (e.g., Lewin & Herlitz, 
2002; Rehnman & Herlitz, 2007), whereas the pattern for men varies. A male own-
gender bias has been noted in some studies (McKelvie, 1981; McKelvie, 1987, 
Experiment 3; Wright & Sladden, 2003), but others found that men recognized female 
faces better than male faces (Ino et al., 2010; McKelvie, 1987, Experiment 2; Rehnman 
& Herlitz, 2007), or no difference in men’s memory for female and male faces (Going 
& Read, 1974; Lewin & Herlitz, 2002; Slone, Brigham, & Meissner, 2000; Sugisaki & 
Brown, 1916). In turn, girls’ and women’s advantage in face recognition memory is 
larger for female faces, whereas the female advantage in memory for male faces is 
typically smaller or non-existent (Bowles et al., 2009; Cross et al., 1971; Feinman & 
Entwisle, 1976; Lewin & Herlitz, 2002; O'Toole et al., 1998; Rehnman & Herlitz, 
2006, 2007). Therefore, the two general patterns that earlier studies suggest are that 
women recognize more female faces than men and more female than male faces, and 
women have no (Pattern A) or a slight (Pattern B) advantage over men in recognition of 















Figure 1. Hypothetical illustration of sex differences in memory for faces. 
 
   17 
Many earlier studies have shown that members of one’s own social and/or biological 
groups tend to be better remembered than other-group members. A well-replicated 
instance of this phenomenon is the own-race bias in memory for faces, showing that 
own-race faces are typically better remembered than other-race faces (for reviews and 
meta-analyses, see Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992; Meissner & Brigham, 2001). 
Similarly, young adults often show an own-age bias, as young adult faces are better 
recognized than older adult faces or children’s faces (for a meta-analysis, see Rhodes & 
Anastasi, 2012). If we view women’s better memory for female than for male faces as 
an own-group bias in memory for faces, the sex difference in memory for female faces 
can be seen as a by-product of women’s own-gender bias in memory for faces. 
 
At which age does an own-gender bias in face processing and recognition appear? 
During infancy, both boys and girls seem to be better at processing female compared to 
male faces; infants require longer time during processing and recognition of male than 
female faces, they are better at matching a female voice with a female face than a male 
voice and face, and a female face prototype seems to emerge before a male face 
prototype (Ramsey, Langlois, & Marti, 2005). It has consistently been shown that girls 
from age 6 and older remember female faces better than male faces (Cross et al., 1971; 
Feinman & Entwisle, 1976; Rehnman & Herlitz, 2006), and this effect is found 
independent of face age and ethnicity (Cross et al., 1971; Rehnman & Herlitz, 2006). 
For boys, the pattern is less clear. Rehnman and Herlitz (2006) found that 9-year-old 
boys recognized own-race boys’ faces better than girls’ faces, whereas other studies 
have shown that boys recognized female and male faces with equal facility (e.g., Cross 
et al., 1971; Feinman & Entwisle, 1976). Even though Ge et al. (2008) assessed 
children’s identification of peers and not recognition of unfamiliar individuals, their 
results are interesting with regard to the gender bias. They found that boys’ 
identification of peers based on isolated internal features was similar for female and 
male facial features at ages 4 and 8, but 14-year-old boys identified more male than 
female peers given their internal features. Ge and colleagues (2008) suggested that, as a 
result of increasing preferences for same sex peers during childhood, differential 
experience with same- and other-sex peers co-occurs with general cognitive 
development, so that with increased age, children become more skilled at recognizing 
peers of the same sex, in turn being a precursor of the adult own-gender bias.  
 
I will now review potential explanations of sex differences in memory for (female) 
faces and women’s own-gender bias. Inherent in some of these explanations is whether 
we should consider these effects as separate or not, and in turn, do we need the same or 
different explanations for the two effects? I will return to these issues in the discussion. 
 
1.3.4 Explanations of sex differences and the female own-gender bias  
The following review is by no means exhaustive, and many of these explanations 
overlap. I have attempted to make predictions given the proposed explanations, as in 
some cases, none are provided by the authors.   
  
Social explanations: Interest, sex-roles. The interest hypothesis has been suggested as 
a potential explanation for why girls remember more female faces than boys: “Girls 
[aged 12 and 17] are better than boys at recognizing female faces, which may reflect 
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their greater interest in female physiognomy, encouraged, perhaps, by the wealth of 
cosmetic advertising to which they are exposed” (Ellis et al., 1973, p. 174). Following 
this reasoning, McKelvie (1981) suggested that women’s advantage over men on 
female faces would only be present for familiar (e.g., same-race) and attractive faces, as 
women would not be expected to allocate more attention to female faces if they are less 
attractive than the male faces. Thus, for unfamiliar and/or unattractive faces, women 
should not remember more female faces than men as they would not use “their special 
inspection strategy” (McKelvie, 1981, p. 123). However, McKelvie (1981) also 
recognized that this might have been a suboptimal explanation, as it did not address 
why women also remembered more children’s faces than men did. Instead, he argued 
that interest in faces could be seen as a combination of exposure to faces and social 
conditioning, and that the interest hypothesis could be tested by using materials that 
men and women assumedly would be differentially interested in. As a later study 
showed a female advantage on adult female and children’s faces and a male advantage 
in memory for cars, this was taken as direct support for the interest hypothesis 
(McKelvie, Standing, St. Jean, & Law, 1993; see also Davies & Robertson, 1993). 
Given the interest hypothesis, then, women should not recognize more female faces 
than men if facial attractiveness is controlled for, and should not show an advantage on 
less attractive, unfamiliar, or out-group female faces (McKelvie, 1981). These 
predictions were tested in Study III, by assessing memory for own- and other-race faces 
and controlling for facial attractiveness.    
 
The sex role hypothesis (Witryol & Kaess, 1957) suggests that the female sex role, 
which emphasizes social facility, influence and strengthen social skills primarily in 
women, which would lead women to remember both female and male faces better than 
men. One potential prediction of this hypothesis is that sex differences should be larger 
between men and women showing traditional sex role schemas (i.e., women with 
feminine and men with masculine gender schemas). Using the Bem sex role inventory, 
Rehnman and Herlitz (2007) assigned men and women into groups depending on 
whether they had feminine or masculine gender schemas and found no differences in 
face recognition memory performance depending on gender schemas, as participants 
with a more feminine gender schema did not perform at a higher level than participants 
with a more masculine gender schema.  
 
1.3.4.1 Biological: Sex hormones and puberty  
Puberty has been suggested as an important period with respect to the organization of 
female and male cognitive functions (e.g., Sisk & Zehr, 2005) and some have argued 
that sex hormones during puberty should be important for the organization of face 
processing and recognition (Scherf, Behrmann, & Dahl, 2012). Therefore, it could be 
speculated that sex differences in memory for faces may become larger during puberty, 
and/or that children with higher sex hormone levels and/or earlier pubertal maturation 
would show larger sex differences in memory for faces. This was assessed in Study I.  
 
1.3.4.2 Cognitive and developmental theories  
It has been suggested that women’s advantage over men could be a result of women 
verbalizing faces to a greater extent than men do, as women’s higher verbal ability may 
support their encoding of faces (Lewin et al., 2001). Now, faces are generally not easy 
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to verbalize, but if women would provide more descriptions of faces during encoding 
(e.g., “dark-haired, friendly-looking woman”), this may increase the probability of later 
recognizing these faces. Lewin and Herlitz (2002) showed that the sex difference in 
memory for faces remained when a composite consisting of verbal fluency and 
performance on a synonyms task was controlled for (see also Herlitz et al., 1997). 
Similarly, it has been suggested that women’s advantage for any material stems from 
their advantage on verbal episodic memory, and that if verbal episodic memory is 
controlled for, women’s advantage in memory for non-verbal materials should be 
attenuated, even though a small sex difference may still remain (Andreano & Cahill, 
2009). Thus, if we control for performance on verbal episodic memory tasks, the sex 
difference in memory for female faces should be reduced. This was tested in an 
additional analysis of data from Study I.  
 
Another suggestion is that women and men use different strategies while processing 
especially female faces, and that women’s encoding of female faces is more elaborate 
than men’s, which would lead to a more detailed encoding of faces, and in turn better 
memory. Divided attention at encoding has earlier been shown to reduce later 
recognition performance (e.g., Kellogg, 1980), and seem to change the encoding 
quality so that it becomes shallower and less elaborate (Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, 
Gavrilescu, & Anderson, 2000). Thus, divided attention at encoding may reduce 
women’s advantage in memory for (female) faces. This was tested in Study II.  
 
The reason why women remember (female) faces better than men could also be a result 
of differential experience. Davies and Robertson (1993), as well as McKelvie et al. 
(1993), assessed sex differences in memory for faces and cars, and as females 
recognized more faces than males, and males more cars than females, the potential 
influence of sex differences in experience with each of the materials was discussed. 
From this perspective, women should not only remember more (female) faces than 
men, but also show an advantage on face processing tasks, and a greater degree of face 
specificity in the core face network. This is reasonable, as performance on perceptual 
face identification tasks is positively related to face recognition memory performance, 
but less so to recognition of other non-face objects such as houses (Wilhelm et al., 
2010). Finally, and related to the expertise account, is the idea that women’s advantage 
for female faces compared to men stems from the expertise girls develop for females in 
infancy, which may be strengthened in childhood for girls, but not for boys as they may 
become more oriented towards other males (Ramsey et al., 2005; Ramsey-Rennels & 
Langlois, 2006).  
 
1.3.4.3 Women’s own-gender bias  
As women seem to mainly outperform men on female faces, and sex differences in 
memory for male faces are often small or non-existent, women’s advantage over men 
may be a result of their own-gender bias. As mentioned earlier, the interest hypothesis 
(McKelvie, 1981) may also be applicable to women’s own-gender bias. Others have 
proposed an evolutionary explanation, with female competition as the main factor 
(Maner et al., 2003), which would bias women in relationships with men to attend more 
to and recognize attractive female faces better than male faces – as these individuals are 
potential competitors threatening their relationships. However, perhaps of a larger 
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interest are frameworks that aim to explain own-group biases in general (Hugenberg, 
Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010; Sporer, 2001).  
 
There are two main perspectives on own-group biases, although they are also typically 
seen as complementary to each other (e.g., Sporer, 2001). The first holds that own-
group biases result from differential experience. This perspective mainly focuses on the 
own-race bias in memory for faces, but has also been applied to the own-age bias (e.g., 
Macchi Cassia, 2011; Rhodes & Anastasi, 2012). According to this account, experience 
is greater for own-race compared to other-race faces, resulting in higher face processing 
skills and in turn better memory for own-race faces (for a review, see Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001). I will refer to this generally as the expertise hypothesis. The second is 
the socio-cognitive account, holding that interest, attention, and motivation create own-
group biases in memory for faces (e.g., Hugenberg et al., 2010). When viewing an out-
group face, a fast categorization response determines that this is an out-group face, 
which in turn leads to that this face is processed in a less efficient manner. This could 
mean less holistical processing, or that features associated with this out-group is 
focused on, which in turn leads to worse later recognition.  
 
There is evidence supporting both accounts. In line with the expertise hypothesis, it has 
been shown that for Caucasians, the composite effect is larger for own-race faces 
(Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006), and own-race facial features are 
better identified when presented in a face but identification of other-race facial features 
is similar when presented in isolation or in a face (Tanaka, Kiefer, & Bukach, 2004). 
Moreover, changes to facial features and their spatial relation are detected more 
accurately in own-race compared to other-race faces (e.g., Rhodes, Hayward, & 
Winkler, 2006). These findings suggest that own-race faces are processed in a more 
holistic manner than other-race faces, but also that component coding of own-race faces 
may be better, which both may be a result of expertise for own-race faces (see also 
Hayward, Rhodes, & Schwaninger, 2008). In addition, self-reported experience with 
other-race individuals is related to a reduced own-race bias in memory (Chiroro & 
Valentine, 1995; Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2003) and configural processing (Hancock 
& Rhodes, 2008; Rhodes et al., 2009). While this has not consistently been replicated 
(Ng & Lindsay, 1994; Slone et al., 2000), a meta-analysis indicated that there is a small 
but significant effect of other-race contact on the own-race bias in memory (Meissner 
& Brigham, 2001). Moreover, the gaze pattern during encoding of own-race faces 
differs from the one observed for other-race faces, as own-race faces receive a larger 
number of fixations, especially the eye region (Goldinger, He, & Papesh, 2009). 
However, it has been shown that mere exposure to other-race faces is not sufficient for 
expertise to develop for these faces (McGugin, Tanaka, Lebrecht, Tarr, & Gauthier, 
2011; Tanaka & Pierce, 2009). In turn, the own-race bias could be a result of that 
people may be more likely to individuate own-race faces, and to process other-race 
faces at the category level (Levin, 2000; Tanaka & Pierce, 2009). Therefore, it has been 
proposed that individuation training, that is, practicing recognition of faces at a 
subordinate (individual) level, is more important for the development of expertise (e.g., 
McGugin et al., 2011).  
 
In support of the socio-cognitive account, there are findings showing that the own-race 
bias can be reduced if participants receive information about the own-race bias and are 
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instructed to attend more to other-race faces before face encoding (Hugenberg, Miller, 
& Claypool, 2007), and own-group biases can be induced by labeling own-race faces as 
out-group and in-group members (Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007). It has 
generally been suggested that own-race faces are more attended to during encoding 
(e.g., Meissner, Brigham, & Butz, 2005), and therefore better recognized than other-
race faces. The relation between preferential viewing and memory for own- and other-
race faces was assessed in Study III.  
 
Similarly, some have proposed that own-race faces may be encoded more elaboratively 
than other-race faces, which would be a more attention demanding strategy (Meissner 
et al., 2005). If this is the case, manipulations that distract or interfere with attentional 
resources (such as a secondary task) during face encoding may reduce the own-race 
bias in memory for faces (e.g., Meissner et al., 2005). This may also be the case for 
women’s own-gender bias. The effect of divided attention on the magnitude of 
women’s own-gender bias was assessed in Study II.   
 
As the FFG and IOG are preferentially engaged during face processing, and increased 
activity in these regions is potentially related to greater visual expertise, it is of interest 
to determine whether BOLD responses in these regions differ between own-race and 
other-race faces. Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, and Eberhardt (2001) found that men’s BOLD 
responses in FFA were higher for own- compared to other-race faces. Moreover, they 
correlated the difference in memory for own- compared to other-race faces with the 
BOLD response throughout the brain that was higher for own-race than other-race 
faces, and found that individuals with a higher BOLD response in left FFG also showed 
a larger own-race bias in memory for faces, and individuals with a higher BOLD 
response for other- than own-race faces had also better memory for other- compared to 
own-race faces. These findings have been replicated in a later study, using a 
categorization task and individually defined areas of FFG and IOG activation (Feng et 
al., 2011). Typically, when faces are categorized as being own- or other-race faces, 
responses are faster for other-race compared to own-race faces. Feng et al. (2011) 
found that faster categorization of other-race than own-race faces was associated with a 
larger difference in left FFA responses to own-race faces. Moreover, they also found 
that BOLD responses in OFA were higher for own- than for other-race faces. Taken 
together, there are a number of studies showing a higher BOLD response in FFG for 
own- compared to other-race faces (Feng et al., 2011; Golby et al., 2001; Kim et al., 
2006). However, less is known about BOLD responses to female and male faces in core 
regions of the face network, and whether differential BOLD responses in left FFG is 
associated with the gender bias in memory for faces. This was tested in Study IV.   
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2 AIMS  
The present thesis aimed to address potential mechanisms of sex differences in 
cognitive abilities, with a special focus on face recognition memory and the gender bias 
in memory for faces. The specific research questions were:  
 
1. Are sex differences in cognitive abilities magnified during puberty, as a result of 
group differences in age, hormone levels, and/or pubertal development (Study I)?  
 
2. Can the female advantage in verbal episodic memory explain sex differences in face 
recognition memory (see Andreano & Cahill, 2009)? That is, if verbal episodic 
memory performance is controlled for, do sex differences in memory for (female) faces 
remain (Study I)? 
 
3. Can the female own-gender bias in face recognition be explained by women 
encoding female faces more elaborately than male faces? In Study II, divided attention 
at encoding was used to assess whether this manipulation would eliminate women’s 
own-gender bias.  
  
4. Does face gender influence men and women’s attention and memory for own- and 
other-race faces (Study III)?   
 
5. Do women, but not men, show a higher BOLD response in FFG and IOG to female 
compared to male faces during incidental face encoding? Is the difference in BOLD 
response of left FFG to female versus male faces related to the difference in memory 
for female and male faces? These questions were addressed in Study IV.  
 
6. How consistent are sex differences in memory for faces and the own-gender bias in 
memory for faces across different studies and samples (Studies I-IV)?  
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3 METHODS AND RESULTS 
 
3.1 STUDY I 
The objective of this study was to assess whether sex differences in cognitive abilities 
were magnified during puberty, as a result of group differences in age, hormone levels, 
and/or pubertal development. If so, these findings would indicate that sex hormones 
have activational and/or organizational effects on the brain and in turn on girls’ and 
boys’ cognitive performance.  
 
3.1.1 Participants 
In this study, 102 girls and 85 boys aged 12-14 years participated. There was no sex 
difference in age (in months).  
 
3.1.2 Materials and procedure 
Participants completed the cognitive tasks in groups of six during the morning. The test 
battery comprised phonetic verbal fluency tasks (letters A, S), a verbal episodic 
memory task (free recall of 16 common nouns), a face recognition memory task (20 
targets and 20 lures; see Lewin & Herlitz, 2002), and a mental rotation task (modified 
from Vandenberg, 1971). The order of the tasks was as follows: (1) presentation of 
faces (3 seconds [sec]/face); (2) presentation of words (3 sec/word); (3) free recall of 
words; (4) word recognition; (5) mental rotations (5 min); (5) face recognition memory 
(10 sec/face). Next, each participant met the test leader individually for collection of 
blood samples by venipuncture and to rate his or her puberty development using a 
booklet (girls, breast and pubic hair development; boys, genital and pubic hair 
development; Hall & Pilström, 1996, 1999). Also, each participant completed two 
verbal fluency tasks (A, S; 1 min/letter).  
 
Serum levels of estradiol (E2) were assessed using Auto DELFIA® Estradiol time-
resolved fluoroimmunoassaykit (detection limit: 10.6 pmol/L); testosterone (T) with 
Auto DELFIA® testosterone-kit (detection limit: 0.02 nmol/L); sex hormone-binding 
globulin (SHBG) with Auto DELFIA® SHBGKit (detection limit: 0.5 nmol/L) (Wallac 
OY, Finland); p-albumin with Inmage™ Immunochemistry Systems (detection limit: 
0.2 g/L) (Beckman Instrument AB). 
 
3.1.3 Statistical analyses 
As the serum level of total T does not capture the level of active testosterone (free T), 
levels of free T were computed using the Vermeulen formula, which assumes that the 
binding constants for albumin and SHBG are known (Vermeulen, Verdonck, & 
Kaufman, 1999).  
 
To create groups of early and late maturers, the pubertal composite measure was 
regressed on age in months for boys and girls, separately. Individuals located above the 
regression line were categorized as early maturers, and individuals below the regression 
line were categorized as later maturers. Similarly, to assess the effect of low versus 
high sex hormone levels (boys, free T; girls, E2), sex hormone levels were regressed on 
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age in months, and again, individuals located above the regression line were 
categorized as having high hormone levels, and individuals below as having lower 
hormone levels.  
 
MANOVAs were used to assess the effects of (1) age (12, 13, 14), (2) pubertal 
maturation (early, late), and (3) sex hormone levels (high, low) on sex differences in 
cognitive performance on the various tasks. Pearson product-moment correlations were 
used to assess the relation between sex hormone levels and cognitive performance, and 
partial correlation analyses of these variables controlling for age in months.   
 
3.1.4 Results 
As expected, girls’ and boys’ levels of endogenous free T and E2 differed, as boys had 
higher levels of free T than girls, and girls had higher levels of E2 than boys. As 
expected, girls outperformed boys in verbal free recall, face recognition memory, and 
verbal fluency, whereas boys performed on a higher level than girls on mental 
rotations. Importantly, the analysis of age, pubertal maturation, and levels of sex 
hormones showed that (1) age did not interact with sex on any of the cognitive 
measures, (2) there were no differences on the cognitive tests between early or late 
maturers as assessed by self-rated puberty, and pubertal development (early, late) did 
not interact with sex of participant, (3) there were no differences on the cognitive tests 
between groups categorized as having high or low sex hormone levels, and there was 
no interaction between sex of participant and high versus low sex hormone levels. 
Finally, there were overall no relations between levels of sex hormones and cognitive 
performance for either boys or girls, apart from a weak positive association between E2 
and mental rotation performance for boys (r = .23). Correcting for multiple tests 
(Bonferroni), this relation was not significant (p > .003).  
 
Conclusions. The results indicate that cognitive sex differences do not increase 
between ages 12-14, and that these differences are not magnified in early maturers, or 
in groups having higher levels of sex hormone. Further, little support was given for a 
relation between individual differences in sex hormone levels and cognitive 
performance.  
 
3.1.5 Additional analyses and results  
Note that the following analyses and results are not included in the manuscript. To 
assess the pattern of an own-gender bias in these age groups, as well as sex differences 
in memory for faces, hit and false alarm rates were computed for female and male 
faces, respectively. For each participant, 0.5 was added to his or her number of hits and 
false alarms, and each measure was divided by total number of trials plus one. Next, 
discrimination sensitivity, d’, was computed (e.g., Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) for 
female and male faces. A mixed ANOVA was computed, assessing the effects of sex, 
age in years, and face gender on d’.  
 
Next, to assess whether the sex difference in memory for female faces was reduced 
when individual differences in verbal episodic memory were held constant, a latent 
measure of verbal episodic memory was created from performance on two verbal 
episodic memory tasks, free recall and word recognition (hits – false alarms). These 
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variables were not normally distributed and were therefore transformed. The word 
recognition variable was reflected; the square root was taken and the variable was 
reflected again. The transformation resulted in an acceptable level of skewness (-1.60). 
For free recall, no transformation resulted in an acceptable level of kurtosis. Therefore, 
this variable was visually binned into seven categories (kurtosis = -0.17). Next, the two 
variables were transformed into Z-scores. The relation between word recognition and 
recall was of moderate size, r(185) = .59, p < .001. The variables were entered into a 
principal component analysis using direct oblimin rotation. The one factor solution 
explained 79.68% of the variance in free recall and word recognition memory. The 
scores from this solution were saved (method = regression) and used as a control 
variable in the analysis of sex differences in memory for female faces. To assess 
whether the expected advantage for girls in memory for female faces remained after 
controlling for verbal episodic memory, a linear regression analysis was run. 
Recognition performance (d’) for female faces was used as the dependent variable. Sex 
of participant and age in months were added as predictors in a first step, followed by 
the latent verbal episodic memory variable. All predictors were mean centered.  
 
The mixed ANOVA showed that girls recognized more faces than boys, F(1, 181) = 
9.22, p = .003, ηp
2 
= .05. In addition, female faces were recognized better than male 
faces, F(1, 181) = 7.83, p = .006, ηp
2 
= .04. As expected, there was an interaction 
between face gender and sex of participant, F(1, 181) = 29.54, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .14, 
showing that girls recognized more female faces than boys did, t(185) = 4.93, p < .001, 
d = 0.72, and that there was no sex difference in memory for male faces, t(185) = -0.75, 
p = .46. Girls recognized more female than male faces, t(185) = 5.78, p < .001, d = 
0.67, whereas there was a trend for boys to recognize male faces better than female 
faces, t(84) = -1.84, p = .07, d = -0.21. Finally, there was an effect of age, F(2, 181) = 
4.50, p = .01, ηp
2 
= .05. Post-hoc tests (LSD) showed that the 12-year-olds recognized 
faces less well than the older age groups (ps < .03), while there was no significant 
difference between ages 13 and 14 in memory for faces (p = .53). The interaction 
between sex and age of participant was not significant, p = .47. Similarly, there was no 
interaction between face gender and age of participant, p = .42. Finally, even though the 
three-way interaction was not significant, p = .07, the presence of gender biases for 
boys and girls was assessed separately in each age group. An own-gender bias was 
present for girls in all age groups: age 12, t(37) = 1.99, p = .05, d = 0.38; age 13, t(25) = 
3.93, p = .001, d = 0.90; age 14, t(37) = 4.27, p < .001, d = 0.84. In contrast, boys aged 
12 and 13 years did not show a gender bias, but 14-year-old boys did: age 12, t(21) = -
.56, p = .58, d = -0.12; age 13, t(34) = -0.30, p = .77, d = -0.05; age 14, t(27) = -2.26, p 

































Figure 2. Girls’ and boys’ average memory performance (d’) for female and male faces 
by age. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
***p ≤ .001; *p ≤ .05.  
 
Finally, the linear regression analysis showed that girls’ advantage in recognition 
memory for female faces remained after controlling for the latent verbal episodic 
memory factor (see Table 1). There was no significant interaction between sex and 
verbal episodic memory (p = .10), showing that the relation between verbal episodic 
memory and face recognition performance was similar in boys and girls. No other 
interactions between the predictors were significant (ps > .08).  
 
Table 1. Effects (β-values) of sex and age on recognition memory (d’) for female 
faces, before and after controlling for verbal episodic memory. 
 
 Predictors Step 1 Step 2 
Sex .34*** .31*** 
Age (in months) .19** .17* 
Verbal episodic memory  .17* 
R
2
 .14 .17 
Note. ***p < .001, *p < .05. 
 
Conclusions: As expected, girls aged 12-14 years showed an own-gender bias, and 
recognized more female faces than boys. In contrast, only 14-year-old boys showed an 
own-gender bias, whereas 12- and 13-year-old boys recognized female and male faces 
with equal facility (see also Ge et al., 2008). Finally, higher verbal episodic memory 
was related to better face recognition performance, but the sex difference remained, 
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suggesting that girls’ advantage in memory for faces cannot be attributed to their 
advantage in verbal episodic memory.   
 
3.2 STUDY II  
The main objective of this study was to assess whether women’s own-gender bias was 
attenuated by divided attention at encoding. This was of interest, as divided attention at 
encoding seems to prevent elaborate encoding strategies; if women’s own-gender bias 
was a result of women encoding female faces more elaborately than male faces, this 
effect should be reduced. In addition, we assessed whether women’s advantage over 
men in memory for female faces under full attention conditions remained when 
attention was divided at encoding.  
 
3.2.1 Participants 
In Experiment 1, there were 35 women and 32 men in the full attention condition, and 
35 women and 32 men in the divided attention condition. Participants were between 17 
and 43 years old (M = 24.66, SD = 4.57). In Experiment 2, 28 women and 16 men 
participated, aged 19-43 years (M = 24.76, SD = 6.09). Experiment 3 included 54 
women and 25 men, aged 17-24 years (M = 18.09, SD = 1.19). There were no sex 
differences in age, years of higher education, or in vocabulary performance. The 
expected sex difference in mental rotation performance was found for participants in 
Experiments 1 and 2, but not for participants in Experiment 3.  
 
3.2.2 Materials and procedure 
In each experiment, there were two face recognition tasks. Twenty faces (10 female, 10 
male) were presented (3 sec/face) during encoding. These target faces and an equal 
amount of distractors were presented during the yes/no recognition test (5 sec/face). To 
divide attention during face encoding, participants performed an auditory task while 
learning faces. In the first experiment, participants monitored a prerecorded list of 
digits presented with a rate of one digit per second, and the task was to detect whenever 
two odd digits were presented, and report the digits in the correct order aloud. In 
experiment 2, the same task was used, but participants instead wrote down the detected 
target digit sequences on a sheet of paper. In the secondary task of experiment 3, digits 
were presented at a rate of one digit per 2 seconds.     
 
Each participant was tested individually in Experiment 1 and in groups in Experiment 2 
and 3. In all three experiments, participants completed two face recognition tasks, one 
with divided attention at encoding, and one with full attention at encoding. In the first 
experiment, a between-groups design was employed for the analysis of attention at 
encoding, as one recognition memory test was excluded because of issues with a highly 
distinct male face in that set. In the second and third experiments, two new sets of faces 
were used that both had been matched for distinctiveness of female and male faces.  
 
3.2.3 Results 
Results showed that women recognized more female than male faces, independent of 
whether faces had been encoded with full or divided attention. Thus, even though face 
recognition memory was markedly reduced by divided attention, the magnitude of 
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women’s own-gender bias in memory for faces remained. Given that the divided 
attention task used in the first two experiments was demanding, and in turn, recognition 
performance was very low, we also assessed whether women’s own-gender bias 
remained if the divided attention task was made easier. Again, the effect was replicated. 
Finally, we noted that in each experiment, women only recognized more female faces 
than men in full attention conditions, suggesting that full attention at encoding may be 
required for women to excel over men in memory for female faces.  
 
Conclusions: Divided attention at encoding did not reduce the magnitude of women’s 
own-gender bias, even though later face recognition memory was impaired by divided 
attention. In turn, women’s own-gender bias does not seem to be a result of effortful 
processing. In contrast, women’s advantage on female faces over men was reduced by 
divided attention, showing that the manipulation had a differential effect on women’s 
own-gender bias and the sex difference in memory for female faces.  
 
3.3 STUDY III 
Previous research suggests that the own-race bias in memory for faces is a result of 
other-race faces receiving less visual attention at encoding. As women typically 
display an own-gender bias in memory for own- and other-race faces (Cross et al., 
1971; Rehnman & Herlitz, 2007; Slone et al., 2000) and men do not, we investigated 
whether face gender and sex of viewer influenced visual attention and recognition 
memory for own- and other-race faces, and if preferential viewing of own-race faces 
contributed to the own-race bias in memory.  
 
Further, it has been suggested that women show an own-gender bias for familiar and 
attractive faces, and that they recognize more female faces than men when the female 
faces are familiar and attractive (McKelvie, 1981). Although not a main aim of the 
study, I will also report here whether the presence of women’s own-gender bias and 
advantage over men remained when facial attractiveness was controlled for, and 
whether familiarity (race of face) influenced the effects.  
 
3.3.1 Participants 
The final sample consisted of 52 Swedish participants (28 women) between ages 17-37 
(M = 22.98, SD = 4.63). There were no sex differences in age, years of higher 
education, or in vocabulary performance.  
 
3.3.2 Materials and procedure 
The viewing task consisted of 40 faces, with an equal number of Swedish, Bangladeshi, 
female, and male faces. Pairs consisting of an own-race and an other-race face were 
presented for 8 sec each. The gender of the face pairs was always the same. The order, 
combination, and position of the screen (left, right) were randomized across 
participants. The face recognition task included all previously seen faces, and an equal 
number of distractor faces from each face category. During the surprise recognition 
test, faces were presented at a rate of 5 sec per face, and participants indicated yes/no 
recognition with a button press.  
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All participants were tested individually. Before completing the tasks, they had been 
informed that the aim of the study was to assess how people look at different pictures, 
and that their gaze would be recorded by an eye-tracker. Participants viewed pictures of 
faces and landscapes before the presentation of own- and other-race faces, and after 
this, another set of faces. After approximately ten minutes, they completed the surprise 
recognition memory test.   
 
Ten women and ten men not participating in the main study rated facial attractiveness 
and distinctiveness. Participants’ scores for each face were averaged and included in 
additional control analyses of viewing time and memory for faces. 
 
3.3.3 Statistical analyses 
For the eye-tracking data, the face initially gazed upon was determined, as well as the 
total looking time for each face. Total viewing time was aggregated within each person 
for the mixed ANOVA analysis that was run to assess potential differences in viewing 
time depending on sex of viewer, face gender and race.  
 
For the analysis of initial gaze to own- and other-race faces, random-intercept logistic 
regression analyses were run. All trials in which the participant’s gaze was not at the 
fixation cross were excluded. The analysis was run for female and male faces 
separately. The dependent measure was the side of the screen that the participant had 
first gazed upon (left, right), and predictors were the side of the screen on which an 
other-race face had appeared.  
 
Faces were also rated for distinctiveness and attractiveness by a group of men and 
women not participating in the main experiment. These scores were used to create 
averaged values of distinctiveness and attractiveness for each face, in order to control 
for these variables in the analyses of total viewing time and recognition memory. 
Random-intercept regression models were run to control for potential effects of 
attractiveness and distinctiveness on viewing time and memory for faces.  
 
Finally, to test whether the own-race bias in memory for faces was reduced when 
viewing time was controlled for, a random-intercept logistic regression analysis was 
run, with later recognition of each face as the outcome, predicted by gender and race of 
face in a first step, and then controlling for viewing time in a second step. 
 
3.3.4 Results 
The findings from Study III showed that (1) other-race male faces received the initial 
gaze more often than own-race male faces, but there was no difference between initial 
gaze to own- and other-race female faces; (2) own-race females were overall viewed 
longer than other-race females, whereas the difference was smaller for own- and other-
race male faces; (3) women recognized more female than male faces, independent of 
face ethnicity, whereas men overall recognized female and male faces to an equal 
extent. Moreover, the own-race bias was larger for female than for male faces. (4) 




Controlling for attractiveness and distinctiveness did overall not influence these results, 
with the exception for total viewing time, as the difference between own- and other-
race male faces was significant when attractiveness was held constant. Thus, own-race 
faces were viewed longer than other-race faces, although the difference was larger for 
female faces.  
 
Conclusions: Women recognized more female than male faces and more female faces 
than men, independently of ethnicity of the viewed faces. Men recognized men and 
women equally well. Moreover, women’s own-gender bias and advantage over men in 
memory for female faces remained when facial attractiveness was controlled for, 
suggesting that differential interest or attention in especially attractive (own-race) 
female faces cannot explain these effects. Finally, longer viewing time of own-race 
female compared to other-race female faces could not explain the difference in memory 
for these faces.  
 
3.4 STUDY IV 
The aim of study IV was two-fold: (1) to assess whether women showed higher BOLD 
responses in FFG and IOG to female compared to male faces; and (2), if there was a 
relation between differential BOLD responses in left FFG and the difference in 
memory for female and male faces. These questions were addressed in an event-related 
fMRI study using an individual ROI-based approach. This would address whether 
women’s own-gender bias in memory for faces resembles findings for the own-race 
bias, showing higher BOLD responses in core face processing regions for own- than for 
other-race faces (e.g., Feng et al., 2011). In addition, we investigated whether there 
were sex differences in brain activity in these regions during face encoding.  
 
3.4.1 Participants 
The final sample included 15 women and 14 men between ages 20-31 (M = 25.13, SD 
= 3.38). There were no sex differences in years of education or in vocabulary 
performance.  
 
3.4.2 Materials and procedure 
Twelve young female faces, 12 young male faces plus 24 older adult faces were 
selected for the incidental encoding session. During this session, faces and a low-level 
perceptual baseline stimulus were presented for 3.5 sec each, followed by a random 
jitter during which a fixation cross was presented (M = 3.5 sec). Participants were 
instructed that they were to see faces, and to watch these as if they were at home 
watching TV while they were being scanned. After approximately 10 minutes, 
participants completed a surprise face recognition task in the scanner (also including 12 
young female lures, 12 young male lures, 24 older adult lures). The focus of Study IV 
was on incidental encoding of own-age faces. Therefore only fMRI data from the 
encoding session and behavioral data from the recognition session were included in the 
analyses.  
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3.4.3 Statistical analyses 
The 206 volumes acquired during the incidental encoding session for each participant 
were preprocessed using standard protocols (slice time corrected, realigned, and 
normalized). For each individual, a general linear model was run, including the onset 
times for each face category, the baseline stimulus, as well as 6 movement parameters 
and an intercept as regressors.  
 
ROIs were specified on an individual basis, as activity in FFG and IOG to faces (> 
baseline) in clusters of 8 or more voxels significant at the threshold p < .0001 
(uncorrected). The threshold had to be relaxed for four participants in order to define 
functional ROIs in IOG (n = 3, p < .001, uncorrected; n = 1, p < .05, uncorrected). For 
each individual, the average parameter estimates for female and male faces were 
extracted, in left and right FFG and IOG, respectively.  
 
For the correlational analyses, difference scores were computed (parameter estimate 
female faces – parameter estimate male faces) in each hemisphere and region 
separately, for each individual. Similarly, difference scores were created from each 
individual’s memory for female versus male faces (d’female faces – d’male faces).   
 
3.4.4 Results 
Women recognized more female faces than male faces, and that there was overall no 
difference in men’s memory for female and male faces. Importantly, we found that 
women indeed showed a higher BOLD response in FFG and IOG to female than to 
male faces, whereas the differences were not reliable for men. Across men and women, 
a higher BOLD response in left FFG to one gender compared to the other was 
associated with better memory for that gender. In addition, we also found that men had 
a higher BOLD response than women to male faces in left FFG and right IOG (see also 
Ino et al., 2010; Mather et al., 2010).  
 
Conclusions: Women showed a higher BOLD response in FFG and IOG to female 
than male faces, recognized more female than male faces, whereas there were no 
differences in men’s recognition and BOLD responses to female and male faces. 
Across men and women, the difference in left FFG BOLD response to female and male 
faces was related to the difference in memory for female versus male faces. These 
findings suggest that differential BOLD responses in left FFG may underlie the bias to 
recognize one gender better than the other.   
 
3.5 MINI-META-ANALYSIS: STUDIES I-IV 
For descriptive purposes, weighted average effect sizes were computed from the results 
of Studies I-IV (see Table 2, Total [I-IV]), and represent the average effect sizes for full 
attention conditions and own-race faces. Effect sizes were combined using a fixed 





Table 2. Effect sizes for the gender bias and sex differences in memory for female and 
male faces in Studies I-IV. A positive effect size for the gender bias indicates that more 
female than male faces were recognized, whereas a negative value indicates that more 
male than female faces were recognized. A positive value of the sex difference 
indicates a female advantage; a negative value indicates a male advantage. Weighted 
average effect sizes are found in the row Total (I-IV).  
 










Female faces Male faces 
Study I       
Age 12 38 22 0.38 -0.12 0.46 -0.02 
Age 13 26 35 0.90 -0.05 0.70 -0.11 
Age 14 38 28 0.84 -0.48 1.26 -0.11 
Total (Study I) 102 85 0.67 -0.21 0.72 -0.11 
       
Study II       
Experiment 1 35 32 0.75  0.07 1.06  0.29 
Experiment 2 28 16 0.42 -0.31 0.65 -0.03 
Experiment 3 54 25 0.66  0.07 0.49 -0.11 
Total (Study II) 117 73 0.61 -0.03 0.78  0.15 
       
Study III       
Own-race faces   1.11  0.71 0.45 -0.03 
Other-race faces   0.59 -0.01 0.47 -0.10 
Total (Study III) 28 24 1.26  0.33 0.72 -0.15 
       
Study IV 15 14 0.65  0.03 0.59 -0.09 
       
Total (I-IV) 262 196 0.67 -0.05 0.71  0.01 
Note. For Study II, effect sizes from the full attention conditions are presented. All 
effect sizes were computed from measures of d’. The total effect sizes presented 
separately for each study were computed across all participants in the given study (i.e., 
effect sizes were not weighted by subsamples).  
 
 
Conclusion: Results are consistent with previous findings, showing that the female 
own-gender bias is substantial and replicable across studies using different samples and 
procedures. Men, on the other hand, do not show a gender bias. Further, women 
consistently outperform men on female faces, but there is no sex difference in memory 
for male faces.   
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4 DISCUSSION 
In this thesis, my aims were to target potential explanations of sex differences in 
cognitive abilities (i.e., mental rotation, verbal fluency, verbal episodic memory, face 
recognition), with a special focus on the mechanisms and explanations of the sex 
difference in memory for female faces and the female own-gender bias in memory for 
faces. I will now turn to discuss the specific research questions.  
 
4.1 THE ROLE OF PUBERTY AND SEX HORMONES 
Results of Study I replicated the commonly observed pattern of sex differences, with a 
male advantage in mental rotations (e.g., Voyer et al., 1995), and a female advantage in 
verbal fluency and episodic memory for faces and words (e.g., Kramer et al., 2001). 
However, these results did not support the idea that sex differences in cognitive abilities 
are magnified during puberty. This is very much in line with previous cross-sectional 
studies of cognitive sex differences across childhood and adolescence, showing that sex 
differences were not magnified between ages 10-14 (e.g., Gur et al., 2012). In addition, 
the magnitude of sex differences did not differ between groups of individuals with 
earlier or later pubertal maturation, or individuals with higher or lower levels of sex 
hormones. These findings suggest that earlier pubertal maturation or higher levels of 
sex hormones do not magnify cognitive sex differences, as would be expected if the 
changes during puberty would affect cognitive abilities in a sex-typical manner (i.e., 
enhancing performance on tasks that show sex differences in adults). Moreover, Study I 
failed to show consistent relations between individual differences in sex hormone levels 
and cognitive performance on the tasks. Two earlier studies indicated that higher levels 
of T were related better spatial performance in young and older adolescent boys 
(Davison & Susman, 2001; Hassler, 1992), but no relation between boys’ mental 
rotation performance and levels of free T was found in Study I. There are few studies 
on children in this age span, but as for now, results are largely inconsistent and no 
relations between individual differences in sex hormone levels and cognitive 
performance have successfully been replicated.  
 
Conclusion: Sex differences in cognitive abilities are not magnified during early 
adolescence, and are not larger for earlier maturers, or children with higher levels of 
sex hormones. These findings suggest that sex differences in spatial (and other) abilities 
are not a result of pubertal maturation or its associated changes in girls’ and boys’ 
levels of sex hormones, which seems reasonable as these sex differences are found 
much earlier than the typical ages in which pubertal development begins. Therefore, the 
reasons for sex differences in cognitive abilities should be sought after earlier in 
development. Finally, there were no consistent relations between girls’ and boys’ levels 
of sex hormones and performance on the various cognitive tasks. This adds to the 
wealth of mixed findings in this area, suggesting that there are no relations between 
individual differences in sex hormone levels and performance on verbal fluency, mental 
rotations, or episodic memory for faces and words (e.g., Davison & Susman, 2001; 
Hassler et al., 1992; Janowsky et al., 1998; Moffat & Hampson, 1996).  
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4.2 VERBAL EPISODIC MEMORY AND SEX DIFFERENCES IN MEMORY 
FOR FACES 
The additional analyses of data from Study I showed that girls’ advantage in memory 
for female faces remained when verbal episodic memory was controlled for. Even 
though there was a relation between verbal episodic memory performance and memory 
for female faces, and girls performed at a higher level than boys on these two measures, 
it is clear that the sex differences in these two abilities to a large extent are independent. 
This is in line with evidence from lesion studies (Farah et al., 2000; Moscovitch et al., 
1997) and correlational findings of studies using structural equation modeling (e.g., 
Wilhelm et al., 2010), suggesting that face processing is a specific ability, in the sense 
that good face recognition performance does not necessarily imply that you perform 
well on recognition tasks of non-face materials. This finding, and others’, showing that 
women’s advantage in memory for faces is not reduced by controlling for verbal 
abilities (Herlitz et al., 1997; Lewin & Herlitz, 2002), clearly illustrates the notion that 
the sex difference in memory for female faces is independent from the sex differences 
in verbal fluency and verbal episodic memory.  
 
Conclusions: Most findings suggest that the sex differences in episodic memory are 
highly dependent on the material, favoring females on words and faces, and favoring 
males on visuospatial materials, all tapping their own specialized ability and related 
brain networks. Even though women’s advantage over men in verbal episodic memory 
and memory for odors may be linked to women’s ability to verbalize the material 
(Larsson et al., 2003), this is not the case for the female advantage in memory for 
female faces. 
 
4.3 THE ROLE OF ATTENTION 
In Study II, we asked the question whether women use more elaborate strategies when 
encoding female compared to male faces, resulting in the female own-gender bias in 
memory for faces. To test this hypothesis, a divided attention task was used at encoding 
of faces to reduce any type of elaborate encoding or encoding strategies. The three 
experiments of Study II showed that women’s own-gender bias remained when 
attention was divided at encoding. This suggests that women may encode female faces 
more efficiently than male faces when available attentional resources are greatly 
reduced and possibly, that women’s own-gender bias stems from more efficient 
perceptual processing of female faces during encoding (Megreya et al., 2011).  
 
Even though full attention is not necessary for later recognition, it is important for 
optimal recognition performance (e.g., Kellogg, 1980). It is not fully clear which 
aspects of encoding that divided attention affects, but it has been suggested that divided 
attention may affect several types of processing, such as initial registration of the 
material, and later elaborate processing (for a discussion, see Naveh-Benjamin, Guez, 
& Marom, 2003). Moreover, divided attention at encoding of words attenuates 
prefrontal and medial temporal lobe brain activity in regions related to encoding 
(Anderson et al., 2000; Iidaka, Anderson, Kapur, Cabeza, & Craik, 2000), and has been 
shown to reduce brain activity in material-specific regions. For instance, regions in the 
temporal lobe associated with reading and writing showed less activity with divided 
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attention during encoding of word pairs (Anderson et al., 2000). Thus, even when the 
quality of the encoding may have been greatly reduced by divided attention, women 
still recognized female faces to a higher extent than male faces.  
 
In contrast to women’s own-gender bias, there were no sex differences in the 
recognition of female faces when attention was divided attention at encoding. Even in 
the third experiment, in which an easier secondary task was used, women did not 
recognize more female faces than men did. Why? One suggestion is that if divided 
attention at encoding reduced the BOLD response in material-specific regions, such as 
FFG, this may lead to a disproportional impairment of women’s performance on female 
faces compared to men’s, as women seem to have overall a lower BOLD response in 
FFG to faces than men. This has also been noted for activity in the prefrontal cortex, 
with men showing a higher BOLD response to faces during encoding (e.g., Ino et al., 
2010). This could also be an indicator as to why women’s advantage for female 
compared to male faces remained when attention was divided – female faces could still 
evoke higher activity in FFG than male faces, as a general attenuation of brain activity 
may be expected.  
 
Conclusion: Women do not appear to put more effort into encoding female than male 
faces, instead, women’s encoding of female faces seems to be more efficient than for 
male faces, which may be related to perceptual expertise for female faces.  
On the other hand, women may require full attention to outperform men in recognition 
of female faces, suggesting that women’s memory for female faces relative to men is 
more sensitive to the effects of divided attention. 
 
4.4 THE INFLUENCE OF FACE GENDER ON THE OWN-RACE BIAS 
In Study III, we found that face gender modulated the own-race bias in attention and 
memory for faces. Other-race male faces received the initial gaze to a somewhat higher 
extent than own-race male faces. This bias may be linked to the potential threat that 
may be associated with out-group male faces (Navarrete et al., 2009). However, over 
time, own-race faces were viewed longer than other-race faces, with a larger difference 
in viewing time for female than male faces. In addition, the own-race bias was 
magnified for female faces, whereas it was not statistically reliable for male faces. It 
may be the case that the design of Study III reduced the own-race bias for male faces, 
as there are findings showing that the presence of an other-race male may reduce later 
recognition of own-race males (Kleider & Goldinger, 2001). On the other hand, 
Rehnman and Herlitz (2007) also found a magnified own-race bias for female faces, 
when faces were presented one at a time during encoding.  
 
As differential attention at encoding has been suggested as a crucial factor 
strengthening the own-race memory bias, we assessed whether controlling for viewing 
time would decrease it. This was of particular interest as own-race female faces were 
better recognized than other-race female faces, and also viewed longer than other-race 
female faces. Even though longer viewing time at encoding was related to a higher 
probability of recognizing a face, controlling for viewing time did not change the 
magnitude of the own-race bias for (female) faces. Thus, merely viewing an own-race 
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face longer than an other-race face does not necessarily mean that this difference 
induces an own-race bias.  
 
Moreover, Study III shows the importance of linking viewing time to face recognition 
at the item level. An earlier study computed difference scores for viewing time during 
encoding of own- and other-age faces, and for recognition memory of own- and other-
age faces, and then correlated the two (e.g., He, Ebner, & Johnson, 2011). Using this 
procedure, I created difference scores for the own-race bias in total viewing time and in 
memory for faces. There was a positive correlation between the difference scores (r[50] 
= .30), which some would interpret to show that longer viewing of own-race faces can 
explain or contribute to the own-race bias in memory. In contrast, results of the random 
intercept analysis in Study III showed there was a relation between viewing time and 
later recognition, although the own-race bias in memory remained when viewing time 
was controlled for. Thus, analyzing the data on the item level or the aggregated level 
answers different questions – can viewing time explain the difference in later 
recognition – or, do individuals showing a larger bias in viewing for own- compared to 
other-race faces have a larger own-race bias in memory? It is clear that even though 
there may be a tendency for individuals showing a larger own-race bias in memory to 
view own-race faces longer than other-race faces, and faces viewed longer having a 
higher probability of being recognized later, it is not necessarily so that longer viewing 
time of own-race faces leads to that these faces are better recognized. If so, viewing 
time would have accounted for a larger part of the variance in recognition of own- and 
other-race faces.   
 
Finally, we found that women showed an own-gender bias for both own- and other-race 
faces (see also Rehnman & Herlitz, 2007), and that their better recognition of female 
compared to male faces remained when facial attractiveness was controlled for, which 
is not in line with the interest hypothesis (e.g., McKelvie, 1981). It is interesting that 
young adult women’s own-gender bias generalizes to less familiar faces, as it has also 
been noted for faces of children (Rehnman & Herlitz, 2007) and older adults (Mason, 
1986).  
 
Conclusion: Face gender may modulate the own-race bias, as the own-race effects are 
more pronounced for female than male faces. Own-race female faces seem to be special 
compared to other-race female faces, in the sense that both men and women 
preferentially attend to them and recognize them better. On the other hand, other-race 
male faces seem to attract the initial attention more often than own-race faces, 
suggesting that it may be of a higher functional importance to attend to these 
individuals. Viewing time cannot fully account for the higher probability of recognizing 
an own-race compared to an other-race face.  
 
4.5 THE INFLUENCE OF FACE GENDER ON BRAIN ACTIVITY 
Study IV showed that women’s BOLD response in FFG and IOG was higher for 
female than for male faces. Moreover, the results showed that a relatively higher BOLD 
response in left FFG to one gender compared to the other was related to better memory 
for that gender. These results are very much in line with findings on the own-race bias 
(e.g., Feng et al., 2011; Golby et al., 2001), suggesting that the same pattern holds for 
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women, being the group commonly showing an own-gender bias in memory for faces. 
Interestingly, men did not show differential BOLD responses to female and male faces, 
and they recognized female and male faces with equal facility.  
 
A higher BOLD response in FFG and IOG for own- compared to other-group faces has 
previously been interpreted to either suggest expertise with own-group faces, or that 
these faces are more attended to (e.g., Feng et al., 2011; Golby et al., 2001). It is 
difficult to discern what differential FFG responses represent, as BOLD responses in 
FFG (FFA) may be modulated by attentional demands (Wojciulik, Kanwisher, & 
Driver, 1998) as well as by expertise with the material (e.g., Bilalić et al., 2011).  
 
It is interesting to note that differences in the magnitude of left FFG responses to 
female and male faces were related to the gender bias in memory. A higher BOLD 
response in FFG during encoding has also been shown for later recognized compared to 
forgotten faces (Prince, Dennis, & Cabeza, 2009), suggesting that the FFG supports 
successful facial encoding processes. For the findings of Study IV, this suggests that 
the category of faces recognized better engaged the (left) FFG to a higher extent during 
encoding than faces that were not recognized as well. It should also be noted that 
participants in Study IV did not know that a face recognition test would follow, 
suggesting that such encoding processes would not have been strategic.  
 
Of interest is that we observed a sex difference in left FFG and right IOG, with men 
showing a higher BOLD response than women to male faces (see also Ino et al., 2010; 
Mather et al., 2010), in the absence of a sex difference in memory performance. As in 
Study IV, Ino et al. (2010) did not observe sex differences in memory for faces, but 
found that men generally activated more brain areas than women during encoding of 
faces. Some of these areas were bilateral FFG and right IOG; but of these regions, men 
only showed a higher response than women to male faces in the right FFG. Ino et al. 
(2010) suggested that women processed faces more efficiently than men, and therefore 
required a lower BOLD response while performing at a similar level as men did. In line 
with the idea that women may show markers of more efficient face processing at the 
neural level than men, Golarai et al. (2010) found that adolescent girls and women 
showed more face-specific BOLD responses than adolescent boys and men did, as 
evidenced by a larger number of activated voxels in FFG to male faces compared to 
common objects (see also Tahmasebi et al., 2012). In contrast to the whole brain 
approach used by Ino et al. (2010), Golarai et al. (2010) used a localizer task and 
individually defined ROIs.  
 
Conclusion: Women show higher BOLD response to female than male faces in core 
regions of the face network during incidental encoding, while also recognizing more 
female than male faces. Men do not differentiate between female and male faces, 
neither in memory performance nor in BOLD responses. In turn, these findings may 
indicate that women are experts on female compared to male faces.  
 
4.6 MINI-META-ANALYSIS: STUDIES I-IV 
Results from Study I showed that girls’ advantage over boys in memory for female 
faces were present for all age groups. This is what one would expect, given the studies 
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showing that girls from about the age of 6 and onwards recognize more female faces 
than boys, and more female than male faces (Cross et al., 1971; Ellis et al., 1973; 
Feinman & Entwisle, 1976).  
 
As expected, girls’ own-gender bias was present at ages 12-14 (e.g., Cross et al., 1971). 
An own-gender bias was also observed for 14-year-old boys (cf., Ge et al., 2008), but it 
is not clear whether this is a chance finding, or if boys indeed at this age show an own-
gender bias. Twelve- and 13-year-old boys recognized female and male faces with 
similar facility, and other studies have not consistently reported an advantage for boys 
on male compared to female faces (Cross et al., 1971; Ellis et al., 1973; Feinman & 
Entwisle, 1976; Rehnman & Herlitz, 2006).  
 
Finally, the mini-meta-analysis of Studies I-IV of the present thesis showed that the 
female own-gender bias and the female advantage over men in memory for female 
faces were consistent and of medium size. For men, it is clear that they do not show an 
own-gender bias at the group level, and across the four studies, there was no sex 
difference in memory for male faces. 
 
4.7 MECHANISMS OF WOMEN’S OWN-GENDER BIAS AND SEX 
DIFFERENCES IN MEMORY FOR FACES 
Generally, the results of the present thesis confirm previous observations: women show 
an own-gender bias, whereas men do not, and women excel over men in memory for 
female faces but not for male faces (e.g., Lewin & Herlitz, 2002; McKelvie, 1987). 
Does this mean that the sex difference in memory for female faces is a result of women 
showing an own-gender bias in memory for faces, whereas men do not?  
 
4.7.1 Is women’s advantage over men specific for female faces?  
There are findings suggesting that women have an advantage over men also in 
processing of and memory for male faces. McBain et al. (2009) assessed potential sex 
differences in detection of male facial contours, tree contours, and on male facial 
identity discrimination. In the detection task, women’s advantage was largest for 
upright faces, smaller for upside-down faces, and there was no difference between men 
and women in identification of tree contours. Women did not outperform men in the 
easiest condition of the identity discrimination task, which had a short ISI (0.5 sec) 
between encoding and test. However, women performed at a higher level than men in 
the two more difficult conditions, one with a longer ISI (3 sec), and one with visual 
noise added to the images (cf. mismatch trials, Megreya et al., 2011).  
 
Similarly, Bowles et al. (2009) found that women had an advantage over men on both 
the Cambridge Face Memory Test (CMFT) and the Cambridge Face Perception Test 
(CFPT), two tasks that only include male faces. In turn, they argued that women’s 
advantage over men could not be interpreted as an own-group bias for women, and that 
small sample sizes likely was the reason why other studies (e.g., Lewin & Herlitz, 
2002; McKelvie et al., 1993) only found an advantage favoring women on female 
faces. Here, the mini-meta-analysis of effect sizes across Studies I-IV, based on a total 
number of 492 participants, showed that there was no sex difference in memory for 
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male faces (see Table 2). Thus, it is unlikely that the presence of a female advantage on 
male faces is a question of power; there is likely another explanation. Indeed, in the 
CFMT, six male faces presented in different views are learned. Recognition of these 
faces is tested in three different tasks, each requiring the selection of the target among 
two distractors. In these tasks, the same encoded images of targets, novel images of 
targets (e.g., altered view), and novel images of the targets with visual noise added are 
presented together with lure faces. Unfortunately, Bowles et al. (2009) did not report 
men and women’s performance on the various recognition conditions separately, but it 
may be the case that women’s advantage over men was not present on the easiest 
recognition task, but only on the more difficult tasks (cf. Godard & Fiori, 2012; 
McBain et al., 2009). Thus, women seem to outperform men on male faces when the 
task depends on sensitivity to low spatial frequency (configural) information. 
Moreover, in the CFPT, the task is to sort a number of morphed faces depending on 
their similarity to a target face, which is also similar to the identity discrimination task 
used by McBain et al. (2009). Thus, under certain conditions, women have an 
advantage over men in perceptual processing and memory for male faces, but mainly 
when visual noise has been added to the images, when the picture of the target has been 
altered between encoding and test, and when fine-grained discrimination of an 
individual’s identity is required. 
 
Conclusion: In face of these findings, it is difficult to conclude that women’s 
advantage over men only is found in perceptual processing and memory for female 
faces. In turn, women’s own-gender bias in memory for faces may not completely 
account for the findings of a sex difference in memory for female faces. Women seem 
to have a more general advantage compared to men in processing and memory for 
faces, which is also in line with fMRI findings (e.g., Golarai et al., 2010).      
 
4.7.2 The potential role of expertise 
The results of Study II and IV suggest that mechanisms of women’s own-gender bias 
and the sex difference may be somewhat different, both with respect to the effects of 
divided attention, and to the patterns of men and women’s BOLD responses to faces. 
On the other hand, the exact same patterns may not be expected, given that one effect is 
found within individuals (women’s own-gender bias) and the other between (sex 
difference in memory for female faces).  
 
The results reviewed in the Introduction and in section 4.6.1 suggest that women also 
have an advantage over men on facial discrimination and recognition tasks that is not 
limited to female faces (Bowles et al., 2009; McBain et al., 2009; Megreya et al., 2011). 
In addition, the findings of sex differences in BOLD and event-related potential 
responses to faces suggest that men and women may process faces somewhat 
differently (Golarai et al., 2010; Proverbio et al., 2006; Proverbio et al., 2010; 
Tahmasebi et al., 2012). Taken together, this suggest that women have a greater 
expertise for faces than men, which is particularly marked for female faces, as women 
may be more proficient at processing female compared to male faces. In turn, women 
would be expected to show a higher degree of holistic and featural processing of faces 
compared to men, and particularly for female faces. This does not necessarily mean that 
socio-cognitive mechanisms (e.g., a higher motivation to encode one material 
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compared to another) are not involved when women encode female and male faces, as 
expertise most likely would imply a greater interest in the material one is an expert on, 
and more attention is paid to the details.  
 
However, a perceptual expertise account may not be sufficient. Why would there be a 
sex difference in face processing and recognition that is not merely a result of women 
showing an own-gender bias? As mentioned in the Introduction, there are early sex 
differences in orientation to faces versus other objects, in the extent to which girls and 
boys engage in eye-to-eye contact with the mother and other individuals, particularly 
females, and females seem to be more protected from disorders related to impaired face 
processing and recognition such as autism spectrum conditions (for a review, see 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2011). These findings suggest that there may be genetic and/or 
prenatal hormonal factors that influence the degree of orientation to faces and the 
development of face processing, which may make females somewhat more likely than 
males to show a higher degree of orientation to faces. In turn, this may result in females 
developing a neural system more tuned to face processing. Moreover, females’ face 
processing skills would be especially tuned to female faces, as infants learn to 
discriminate between female faces before male faces (Ramsey et al., 2005; Ramsey-
Rennels & Langlois, 2006), and girls may continue to be more oriented towards other 
females, while boys may be more likely to orient themselves to other males during 
childhood. However, it is not clear whether boys are more likely to show an own-
gender bias during adolescence, and why men (at the group level) do not seem to show 
a gender bias at all during adulthood. It may be the case that during late adolescence 
and in adulthood, there is a large variation in men’s experience with female and male 
faces, or, men (as a group) may be equally likely to individuate between females and 
males. Of interest would be to assess whether male individuals showing an own- or 
other-gender bias on one test consistently also show a bias in this direction across 
several other recognition memory tests, which could point to whether this is a stable 
performance pattern on the individual level. In turn, potential reasons for the presence 
or no presence of a male gender bias in memory for faces could be better addressed.  
 
For women, it may not simply be the case that their assumed early expertise “remains” 
in adulthood, but that their presumed expertise for female faces, and maybe faces in 
general, is continuously updated and maintained as they continue to actively 
individuate between females. There are findings suggesting that memory biases for a 
category of faces is highly dependent on short-term previous experience (e.g., Hills, 
2012; for a review, see Macchi Cassia, 2011), and in line with this, short-term 
individuation practice with other-race faces can reduce the own-race bias in memory 
McGugin et al., 2011; Tanaka & Pierce, 2009). Thus, it is likely that current facial 
experience is guided by previous experiences, and will probably guide future 
experiences. 
 
4.8 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
4.8.1 Variations in sex hormone levels 
Within-individual levels of sex hormones vary substantially: with age (pre- and 
postnatally, adrenarche, gonadarche, menopause; and as shown in Study I, between 
ages 12-14), situational factors (stress, exercise), time of year, and shows a cyclic 
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pattern (in women, approximately a monthly cycle; in men, a daily and a seasonal 
cycle; Dabbs, 1990; Sherman & Korenman, 1975; Silverman et al., 1999; Valero-Politi 
& Fuentes-Arderiu, 1998). In Study I, some participants were tested in the spring and 
others during the fall; however, complementary analyses (data not shown) indicated 
that the levels of hormones were not different depending on season. Another related 
issue is that girls who had reached menarche were tested at different days of their 
menstrual cycle. The additional analyses did not reveal any systematic influence on 
cognitive performance, although E2 levels were lower during the follicular compared to 
the luteal phase, as expected.  
 
4.8.2 Difference scores 
In Study IV, difference scores were used. The use of difference scores has been 
criticized, as this type of measure has issues with reliability (Cronbach & Furby, 1970). 
To illustrate this, think of for instance the test-retest reliability for face recognition 
memory, which in some studies has been found to be of moderate size (e.g., 0.63, 
O'Bryant, Hilsabeck, McCaffrey, & Gouvier, 2003). This means that a significant 
amount of error may be introduced when difference scores are formed based on such 
measures. It may be worrying that difference scores for own-group biases seem to be 
somewhat unreliable (e.g., Slone et al., 2000), but nevertheless, a reliable relation 
between differences in BOLD responses of left FFG and memory for female and male 
faces was found in Study IV.  
 
4.8.3 Localizer task and statistical thresholds 
One concern is that no localizer task was included in Study IV. Complex contrast 
stimuli, such as chairs, antique radios, or other objects are typically used to define face-
specific BOLD responses in FFG and IOG (for an overview, see Berman et al., 2010). 
In Study IV, the contrast stimulus was three X’s, which arguably is less complex than 
for instance chairs. Even though a previous study indicated that a simple baseline task 
as well as a localizer task resulted in very similar definitions of individuals’ FFAs 
(Lehmann et al., 2004), some individuals’ peak activations in Study IV were located in 
posterior FFG, in contrast to the more typical observation that FFAs are located in mid-
FFG (Berman et al., 2010). Therefore, additional control analyses were run on data 
extracted from ROIs that only included BA37 in FFG, which showed that the results 
were equivalent.  
 
The use of uncorrected statistical thresholds when assessing BOLD responses may be 
an issue, as appropriate thresholds should be set to avoid Type I errors. In Study IV, we 
used a ROI-based approach, with an uncorrected threshold (p < .0001) and a cut-off of 
at least 8 contiguous activated voxels, in accordance with previous studies (e.g., 
Minnebusch, Suchan, Köster, & Daum, 2009). For four subjects, the statistical 
threshold had to be relaxed in order to find significantly activated clusters in IOG. This 
seems to be a general problem with individually defined ROIs, as the threshold can be 
too strict for defining ROIs in certain individuals, but at the moment, there are no 
perfect guidelines for how face-specific ROIs should be defined on an individual basis 
(Rossion, Hanseeuw, & Dricot, 2012). On the other hand, the use of individual ROI 
definitions seems preferable as compared to defining ROIs based on group activation 
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maps, especially in larger areas such as FFG and IOG, showing large individual 
differences in location of peak voxel activation and cluster size.  
 
4.8.4 Materials and participants 
In Study III, Swedish and Bangladeshi faces were used, but only Swedish participants 
were included. Rehnman and Herlitz (2007) also assessed memory for Swedish and 
Bangladeshi faces in a Swedish sample, and obtained a similar performance pattern 
with a magnified own-race bias for female faces. Whether the set of Bangladeshi faces 
and Swedish participants may be special as compared to participants and faces of other 
ethnicities should be clarified in future studies. In any case, a female own-gender bias 
in face recognition was found in Study III, which also has been found in studies 
conducted in China (Ino et al., 2010), Great Britain (Wright & Sladden, 2003), and the 
US (O’Toole et al., 1998; Slone et al., 2000), suggesting that at least this effect seems 
to be general across various cultural contexts.        
 
4.9 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The findings of the present study indicated that girls’ advantage over boys in memory 
for female faces was not increased between ages 12-14, and the sex difference was not 
larger in individuals with higher levels of sex hormones or more advanced pubertal 
maturation (relative to their age group). Additional analyses also indicated that girls’ 
advantage over boys in memory for female faces was not a result of girls’ higher verbal 
episodic memory. Findings of Study II indicated that women’s own-gender bias is not a 
result of more elaborate processing of female compared to male faces during encoding, 
which would have required working memory processing. Further, controlling for facial 
attractiveness did not reduce women’s own-gender bias (Study III), and women showed 
a higher BOLD response to female than male faces in FFG and IOG (Study IV).  
 
These findings suggest that women process female faces more efficiently than male 
faces during encoding, which may be a result of perceptual expertise for female faces. 
One suggested marker of perceptual expertise is that experts preferentially categorize 
their objects of expertise at a more specific level than novices (Tanaka & Taylor, 1991). 
Interestingly, studies investigating classification of own- and other-race faces at the 
more basic level of face ethnicity have shown that own-race faces are classified slower 
and sometimes even less accurately than other-race faces (e.g., Feng et al., 2011). Of 
interest is that women seem to categorize male faces by gender faster than female faces 
(O'Toole et al., 1998; van Wingen, Mattern, Verkes, Buitelaar, & Fernandez, 2008; but 
see Hoss, Ramsey, Griffin & Langlois, 2005). An additional marker of expertise is the 
reliance on configural information while processing objects-of-expertise (Diamond & 
Carey, 1986), although expertise may also be related to better processing of features 
(e.g., Hayward et al., 2008). It would be of interest to assess whether such potential 
markers of face expertise are also observed for women’s processing of female versus 
male faces, and in relation to men. In addition, why is women’s advantage over men in 
identification and memory for male faces only found on certain tasks? This suggests 
that women may be more sensitive than men to low spatial frequency information in 
faces (i.e., the rough facial configuration), and it would be of interest to assess potential 
sex differences in the subcortical route for face processing. This could give us a better 
idea of whether efficiency of this system is related to women’s advantage on these 
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tasks. I also believe that it would be informative to systematically assess potential sex 
differences in effective connectivity between regions of the core face network during 
face processing, with a particular focus on face gender (see also Mather et al., 2010). 
We also need to address the possibility that women’s ability to encode (female) faces 
may more sensitive than men’s to manipulations, such as divided attention, and why 
this may be the case.  
 
I am of the firm belief that it would be fruitful to use a developmental framework to 
understand females’ own-gender bias and sex differences in perception and memory for 
faces, and instead of testing many different individuals, increase the number of 
measurement occasions for the same individuals. Important longitudinal measures 
would be structural data of the brain, fMRI and/or EEG data, hormonal assays, 
measures of pubertal development, and naturally, a wide variety of behavioral measures 
related to face processing and recognition, but also to other important measures of 
cognitive development (e.g., executive functions, attentional processing, episodic 
memory for other materials than faces). Using such an approach, it may be possible to 
tease apart and assess interactions between biological maturation (in terms of pubertal 
maturation), development of brain structures, general cognitive development (e.g., 
improvement of executive functions), and the development of an increasingly more 
specific neural system for face processing.  
 
As noted by Field and colleagues (1984), commenting on their findings of that neonatal 
girls showed a larger novelty preference than boys for an unfamiliar female face 
compared to their mother’s face: “The sex difference in this study merely contributes to 
what Cohen and Gelber (1975) have labeled a most confusing and contradictory 
literature” (p. 24). Focusing on individual development, a longitudinal approach 
combined with experimental data collections would hopefully resolve many of the 
problems and inconsistencies found in cross-sectional studies addressing the 
development of face processing and recognition, as well as the development of the 
female own-gender bias and sex differences in perception and memory for faces.  
 44 
5 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First of all, I am very grateful to my main supervisor, Agneta Herlitz. You provided 
me with everything I needed to become an independent researcher. You made me think 
hard and work hard, as I could have things my way – if I had a good argument. I cannot 
imagine a better (or more stylish) supervisor, and I look very much forward to our 
continuing work together. Many, many, many thanks!  
 
In addition to an outstanding main supervisor, it is a great thing to have had three 
excellent co-supervisors. To quote Jenny Rehnman, “being a supervisor is a hobby!”. 
Looking back, this is definitely true as you have spent an enormous amount of time on 
my supervision during the last 7 years. Thank you for teaching me so much!  
Torun Lindholm. Thank you for showing me the wonderful world of multilevel 
modeling, for all valuable input, and for always having an open door for me!  
Håkan Fischer. Thank you for learning me about fMRI, for involving me in great 
collaborations, and for your never-ceasing optimism! (But let’s not ever take the train 
again...)  
 
There are also other important persons who have contributed to my development as a 
researcher. Lars Bäckman. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to work within an 
exciting and (for me) new research area, and for your perceptive and sharp questions. 
Lars Bergman. Many thanks for giving me the opportunity to work within 
developmental psychology, and for changing the way I view psychology, this time 
forever.  
 
I am grateful to Martin Lövdén, for taking the time to read this thesis and for your 
insightful comments on it.  
 
Many thanks to the best office roommates ever, Joakim Svärd and Jonas Wastesson, 
for providing me not only with excellent company during the days, but also caffeine 
and nicotine whenever I required it to function properly. Also, many thanks to my 
colleague/friend/dog lover, Beata Ferencz. Trips abroad are maybe not always 
enjoyable, but with you, it is always hilariously funny. 500 kronor?!! 
 
I also want to thank all colleagues at Aging Research Center for providing an 
interesting research environment. In particular, present (and former) members of the 
Psychology group, Alex, Alireza, Anna, Bart, Erika, Grégoria, Helena, Jonas P, 
Martin B, Petra, Sari, Yvonne, Åsa, for all discussions and feedback you have given 
me on my work during these years.    
 
I am very grateful to everyone who took their time to participate in the studies of this 
thesis. Also, for making a part of the data collection possible, a big thank you goes to 




   45 
Good people drink good beer! A special thank you to all friends and colleagues at the 
Department of Psychology, Stockholm University, who have illuminated my years 
as a graduate student beerwise and/or otherwise. It wouldn’t have been the same 
without you!   
 
Many, many thanks to my family and friends. In particular to my mother, Eva 
Liedberg, for all support, and for always being there for me! To my favorite boxer, 
Frida Samuelsson, for infinite happiness, and to the best cake baker ever, Anne 
Richter, for sharing this long journey with me.  
 
It was recently claimed that the most important persons are the smallest (Andersson, 
2012). This is obviously not true: Håkan Andersson (n = 1, p = 1), my better half 
(intellectually and musically), colleague, husband, Hammond organist, music 
technician, and lover of mathematician jokes. You have improved the quality of this 
thesis, particularly by criticizing it (successfully). Even more importantly, you have 
forced me to think and talk about Hammond organs (i.e., C3), emulations of guitar 
amps, tripels, lambics, and other important things one cannot live without. Thank you!  
 
 
This research was supported by grants from the Swedish Research Council and the 
Swedish Council for Working Life and Social Research.  
 46 
6 REFERENCES 
Anderson, N. D., Iidaka, T., Cabeza, R., Kapur, S., McIntosh, A. R., & Craik, F. I. M. 
(2000). The effects of divided attention on encoding- and retrieval-related brain 
activity: A PET study of younger and older adults. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 12(5), 775-792.  
Andreano, J. M., & Cahill, L. (2009). Sex influences on the neurobiology of learning 
and memory. Learning & Memory, 16(4), 248-266.  
Anthony, T., Copper, C., & Mullen, B. (1992). Cross-racial facial identification: A 
social cognitive integration. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18(3), 
296-301.  
Anzures, G., Wheeler, A., Quinn, P. C., Pascalis, O., Slater, A. M., Heron-Delaney, 
M., et al. (2012). Brief daily exposures to Asian females reverses perceptual 
narrowing for Asian faces in Caucasian infants. Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 112(4), 484-495.  
Ardila, A., Rosselli, M., Matute, E., & Inozemtseva, O. (2011). Gender differences in 
cognitive development. Developmental Psychology, 47(4), 984-990. 
Ashear, V., & Snortum, J. R. (1971). Eye contact in children as a function of age, sex, 
social and intellective variables. Developmental Psychology, 4(3), 479.  
Baron-Cohen, S., Lombardo, M. V., Auyeung, B., Ashwin, E., Chakrabarti, B., & 
Knickmeyer, R. (2011). Why are autism spectrum conditions more prevalent in 
males? PLoS Biology, 9(6), e1001081. 
Bate, S., Parris, B., Haslam, C., & Kay, J. (2010). Socio-emotional functioning and 
face recognition ability in the normal population. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 48(2), 239-242.  
Becker, J. B. (1999). Gender differences in dopaminergic function in striatum and 
nucleus accumbens. Pharmacology, Biochemistry and Behavior, 64(4), 803-812.  
Bem, S. L. (1983). Gender schema theory and its implications for child development: 
Raising gender-aschematic children in a gender-schematic society. Signs, 8(4), 
598-616.  
Bengner, T., Fortmeier, C., Malina, T., Lindenau, M., Voges, B., Goebell, E., & 
Stodieck, S. (2006). Sex differences in face recognition memory in patients with 
temporal lobe epilepsy, patients with generalized epilepsy, and healthy controls. 
Epilepsy & Behavior, 9(4), 593-600.  
Berenbaum, S. A., & Beltz, A. M. (2011). Sexual differentiation of human behavior: 
Effects of prenatal and pubertal organizational hormones. Frontiers in 
Neuroendocrinology, 32(2), 183-200.  
Berman, M. G., Park, J., Gonzalez, R., Polk, T. A., Gehrke, A., Knaffla, S., & 
Jonides, J. (2010). Evaluating functional localizers: The case of the FFA. 
NeuroImage, 50(1), 56-71. 
Bernstein, M. J., Young, S. G., & Hugenberg, K. (2007). The cross-category effect: 
Mere social categorization is sufficient to elicit an own-group bias in face 
recognition. Psychological Science, 18(8), 706-712. 
Bilalić, M., Langner, R., Ulrich, R., & Grodd, W. (2011). Many faces of expertise: 
Fusiform face area in chess experts and novices. The Journal of Neuroscience, 
31(28), 10206-10214.  
Bolla, K. I., Lindgren, K. N., Bonaccorsy, C., & Bleecker, M. L. (1990). Predictors of 
verbal fluency (FAS) in the healthy elderly. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 
46(5), 623-628.  
   47 
Borenstein, M. (2009). Effect sizes for continuous data. In H. Cooper, L. V. Hedges, 
& J. C. Valentine (Eds.), The handbook of research synthesis and meta-analysis 
(2nd ed., pp. 221-235). New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Bowles, D. C., McKone, E., Dawel, A., Duchaine, B., Palermo, R., Schmalzl, L., et 
al. (2009). Diagnosing prosopagnosia: Effects of ageing, sex, and participant-
stimulus ethnic match on the Cambridge Face Memory Test and Cambridge Face 
Perception Test. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 26(5), 423-455.  
Bramen, J. E., Hranilovich, J. A., Dahl, R. E., Forbes, E. E., Chen, J., Toga, A. W., et 
al. (2011). Puberty influences medial temporal lobe and cortical gray matter 
maturation differently in boys than girls matched for sexual maturity. Cerebral 
Cortex, 21(3), 636-646.  
Bruce, V., & Young, A. (1986). Understanding face recognition. British Journal of 
Psychology, 77(3), 305-327.  
Burkitt, J., Widman, D., & Saucier, D. M. (2007). Evidence for the influence of 
testosterone in the performance of spatial navigation in a virtual water maze in 
women but not in men. Hormones and Behavior, 51(5), 649-654.  
Bushnell, I. W., Sai, F., & Mullin, J. T. (1989). Neonatal recognition of the mother’s 
face. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 7(1), 3-15.  
Cameron, J. L. (2004). Interrelationships between hormones, behavior, and affect 
during adolescence: Understanding hormonal, physical, and brain changes 
occurring in association with pubertal activation of the reproductive axis. Annals 
of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1021, 110-123.  
Cellerino, A., Borghetti, D., & Sartucci, F. (2004). Sex differences in face gender 
recognition in humans. Brain Research Bulletin, 63(6), 443-449.  
Chance, J. E., & Goldstein, A. G. (1979). Reliability of face recognition performance. 
Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 14(2), 115-115-117.  
Chiroro, P., & Valentine, T. (1995). An investigation of the contact hypothesis of the 
own-race bias in face recognition. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology A: Human Experimental Psychology, 48A(4), 879-894.  
Choudhury, E. S., Moberg, P., & Doty, R. L. (2003). Influences of age and sex on a 
microencapsulated odor memory test. Chemical Senses, 28(9), 799-805.  
Christiansen, K., & Knussmann, R. (1987). Sex hormones and cognitive functioning 
in men. Neuropsychobiology, 18(1), 27-36.  
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). US: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Cohen Kadosh, K., Cohen Kadosh, R., Dick, F., & Johnson, M. H. (2011). 
Developmental changes in effective connectivity in the emerging core face 
network. Cerebral Cortex, 21(6), 1389-1394.  
Collaer, M. L., & Hines, M. (1995). Human behavioral sex differences: A role for 
gonadal hormones during early development? Psychological Bulletin, 118(1), 55-
107.  
Connellan, J., Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Batki, A., & Ahluwalia, J. (2000). 
Sex differences in human neonatal social perception. Infant Behavior & 
Development, 23(1), 113-118.  
Cronbach, L. J., & Furby, L. (1970). How we should measure “change”: Or should 
we? Psychological Bulletin, 74(1), 68-80.  
Crookes, K., & McKone, E. (2009). Early maturity of face recognition: No childhood 
development of holistic processing, novel face encoding, or face-space. 
Cognition, 111(2), 219-247.  
Cross, J. F., Cross, J., & Daly, J. (1971). Sex, race, age, and beauty as factors in 
recognition of faces. Perception & Psychophysics, 10(6), 393-396.  
 48 
Dabbs, J. M. Jr. (1990). Age and seasonal variation in serum testosterone 
concentration among men. Chronobiology International, 7(3), 245-249.  
Darwin, C. (1871). The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex, Vol 2. London, 
England: John Murray. 
Davies, G., & Robertson, N. (1993). Recognition memory for automobiles: A 
developmental study. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 31(2), 103-106.  
Davison, K. K., & Susman, E. J. (2001). Are hormone levels and cognitive ability 
related during early adolescence? International Journal of Behavioral 
Development, 25(5), 416-428.  
de Frias, C., Nilsson, L., & Herlitz, A. (2006). Sex differences in cognition are stable 
over a 10-year period in adulthood and old age. Aging, Neuropsychology, and 
Cognition, 13(3), 574-587.  
Diamond, R., & Carey, S. (1986). Why faces are and are not special: An effect of 
expertise. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 115(2), 107-117.  
Dorn, L. D., Dahl, R. E., Woodward, H. R., & Biro, F. (2006). Defining the 
boundaries of early adolescence: A user's guide to assessing pubertal status and 
pubertal timing in research with adolescents. Applied Developmental Science, 
10(1), 30-56.  
Doty, R. L., & Kerr, K. (2005). Episodic odor memory: Influences of handedness, 
sex, and side of nose. Neuropsychologia, 43(12), 1749-1753.  
Ellis, H., Shepherd, J., & Bruce, A. (1973). The effects of age and sex upon 
adolescents' recognition of faces. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 123(1), 173-
174.  
Exline, R. V. (1963). Explorations in the process of person perception: Visual 
interaction in relation to competition, sex, and need for affiliation. Journal of 
Personality, 31(1), 1-20.  
Exline, R., Gray, D., & Schuette, D. (1965). Visual behavior in a dyad as affected by 
interview content and sex of respondent. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1(3), 201-209.  
Fagan, J. F. (1972). Infants' recognition memory for faces. Journal of Experimental 
Child Psychology, 14(3), 453-476.  
Fagan, J. F. (1973). Infants' delayed recognition memory and forgetting. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 16(3), 424-450. 
Fairhall, S. L., & Ishai, A. (2007). Effective connectivity within the distributed 
cortical network for face perception. Cerebral Cortex, 17(10), 2400-2406. 
Farah, M. J., Rabinowitz, C., Quinn, G. E., & Liu, G. T. (2000). Early commitment of 
neural substrates for face recognition. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 17(1), 117-
123.   
Feinman, S., & Entwisle, D. R. (1976). Children's ability to recognize other children's 
faces. Child Development, 47(2), 506-510.  
Feng, L., Liu, J., Wang, Z., Li, J., Li, L., Ge, L., et al. (2011). The other face of the 
other-race effect: An fMRI investigation of the other-race face categorization 
advantage. Neuropsychologia, 49(13), 3739-3749.  
Field, T. M., Cohen, D., Garcia, R., & Greenberg, R. (1984). Mother-stranger face 
discrimination by the newborn. Infant Behavior & Development, 7(1), 19-25. 
Fine, J. G., Semrud-Clikeman, M., & Zhu, D. C. (2009). Gender differences in BOLD 
activation to face photographs and video vignettes. Behavioural Brain Research, 
201(1), 137-146.  
Fischer, H., Sandblom, J., Nyberg, L., Herlitz, A., & Bäckman, L. (2007). Brain 
activation while forming memories of fearful and neutral faces in women and 
men. Emotion, 7(4), 767-773.  
   49 
Furl, N., Garrido, L., Dolan, R. J., Driver, J., & Duchaine, B. (2011). Fusiform gyrus 
face selectivity relates to individual differences in facial recognition ability. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(7), 1723-1740.  
Gates, A. I. (1917). Experiments on the relative efficiency of men and women in 
memory and reasoning. Psychological Review, 24(2), 139-146.  
Gauthier, I., Skudlarski, P., Gore, J. C., & Anderson, A. W. (2000). Expertise for cars 
and birds recruits brain areas involved in face recognition. Nature Neuroscience, 
3(2), 191-197.  
Gauthier, I., & Tarr, M. J. (1997). Becoming a “greeble” expert: Exploring 
mechanisms for face recognition. Vision Research, 37(12), 1673-1682.  
Gauthier, I., & Tarr, M. J. (2002). Unraveling mechanisms for expert object 
recognition: Bridging brain activity and behavior. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 28(2), 431-446.  
Ge, L., Anzures, G., Wang, Z., Kelly, D. J., Pascalis, O., Quinn, P. C., et al. (2008). 
An inner face advantage in children's recognition of familiar peers. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 101(2), 124-136. 
Gerstorf, D., Herlitz, A., & Smith, J. (2006). Stability of sex differences in cognition 
in advanced old age: The role of education and attrition. The Journals of 
Gerontology: Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 61B(4), 
P245-P249.  
Geschwind, N., & Galaburda, A. M. (1985a). Cerebral lateralization: Biological 
mechanisms, associations, and pathology: I. A hypothesis and a program for 
research. Archives of Neurology, 42(5), 428-459.  
Geschwind, N., & Galaburda, A. M. (1985b). Cerebral lateralization: Biological 
mechanisms, associations, and pathology: II. A hypothesis and a program for 
research. Archives of Neurology, 42(6), 521-552.  
Geschwind, N., & Galaburda, A. M. (1985c). Cerebral lateralization: Biological 
mechanisms, associations, and pathology: III. A hypothesis and a program for 
research. Archives of Neurology, 42(7), 634-654.  
Gillies, G. E., & McArthur, S. (2010). Estrogen actions in the brain and the basis for 
differential action in men and women: A case for sex-specific medicines. 
Pharmacological Reviews, 62(2), 155-198.  
Godard, O., & Fiori, N. (2010). Sex differences in face processing: Are women less 
lateralized and faster than men? Brain and Cognition, 73(3), 167-175.  
Godard, O., & Fiori, N. (2012). Sex and hemispheric differences in facial invariants 
extraction. Laterality: Asymmetries of Body, Brain and Cognition, 17(2), 202-
216.  
Going, M., & Read, J. D. (1974). Effects of uniqueness, sex of subject, and sex of 
photograph on facial recognition. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 39(1), 109-110.  
Golarai, G., Ghahremani, D. G., Whitfield-Gabrieli, S., Reiss, A., Eberhardt, J. L., 
Gabrieli, J. D. E., & Grill-Spector, K. (2007). Differential development of high-
level visual cortex correlates with category-specific recognition memory. Nature 
Neuroscience, 10(4), 512-522.  
Golarai, G., Liberman, A., Yoon, J. M., & Grill-Spector, K. (2010). Differential 
development of the ventral visual cortex extends through adolescence. Frontiers 
in Human Neuroscience, 3, article 80.  
Golby, A. J., Gabrieli, J. D. E., Chiao, J. Y., & Eberhardt, J. L. (2001). Differential 
responses in the fusiform region to same-race and other-race faces. Nature 
Neuroscience, 4(8), 845-850.  
Goldinger, S. D., He, Y., & Papesh, M. H. (2009). Deficits in cross-race face 
learning: Insights from eye movements and pupillometry. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35(5), 1105-1122.  
 50 
Gottlieb, G. (1998). Normally occurring environmental and behavioral influences on 
gene activity: From central dogma to probabilistic epigenesis. Psychological 
Review, 105(4), 792-802.  
Gouchie, C., & Kimura, D. (1991). The relationship between testosterone levels and 
cognitive ability patterns. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 16(4), 323-334.  
Goy, R. W., & McEwen, B. S. (2007). Sexually dimorphic behavior: Definition and 
the organizational hypothesis. In Einstein G. (Ed.), Sex and the brain (pp.1-12). 
Cambridge, MA, US: MIT Press. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/621883495?accountid=38978 
Guiso, L., Monte, F., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2008). Diversity. culture, gender, 
and math. Science, 320(5880), 1164-1165. 
Gur, R. C., Richard, J., Calkins, M. E., Chiavacci, R., Hansen, J. A., Bilker, W. B., et 
al. (2012). Age group and sex differences in performance on a computerized 
neurocognitive battery in children age 8−21. Neuropsychology, 26(2), 251-265.  
Halari, R., Hines, M., Kumari, V., Mehrotra, R., Wheeler, M., Ng, V., & Sharma, T. 
(2005). Sex differences and individual differences in cognitive performance and 
their relationship to endogenous gonadal hormones and gonadotropins. 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 119(1), 104-117.  
Hall, C., & Pilström, C. (1996). En bok för flickor (A book for girls). Akademiska 
sjukhuset: Uppsala.   
Hall, C., & Pilström, C. (1999). En bok för pojkar (A book for boys). Akademiska 
sjukhuset: Uppsala.   
Hall, J. K., Hutton, S. B., & Morgan, M. J. (2010). Sex differences in scanning faces: 
Does attention to the eyes explain female superiority in facial expression 
recognition. Cognition and Emotion, 24(4), 629-637.  
Halpern, D. F. (2012). Sex differences in cognitive abilities (4th ed.). New York, NY, 
US: Psychology Press.  
Hampson, E. A. (1995). Spatial cognition in humans: Possible modulation by 
androgens and estrogens. Journal of Psychiatry & Neuroscience, 20(5), 397-404. 
Hancock, K. J., & Rhodes, G. (2008). Contact, configural coding and the other-race 
effect in face recognition. British Journal of Psychology, 99(1), 45-56.  
Hassler, M. (1992). Creative musical behavior and sex hormones: Musical talent and 
spatial ability in the two sexes. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 17(1), 55-70. 
Hassler, M., Gupta, D., & Wollmann, H. (1992). Testosterone, estradiol, ACTH and 
musical, spatial and verbal performance. International Journal of Neuroscience, 
65(1-4), 45-60.  
Haut, K. M., & Barch, D. M. (2006). Sex influences on material-sensitive functional 
lateralization in working and episodic memory: Men and women are not all that 
different. NeuroImage, 32(1), 411-422.  
Haxby, J. V., Hoffman, E. A., & Gobbini, M. I. (2000). The distributed human neural 
system for face perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(6), 223-233.  
Haxby, J. V., Ungerleider, L. G., Horwitz, B., Maisog, J. M., Rapoport, S. I., & 
Grady, C. L. (1996). Face encoding and recognition in the human brain. PNAS, 
93(2), 922-927.  
Hayward, W. G., Rhodes, G., & Schwaninger, A. (2008). An own-race advantage for 
components as well as configurations in face recognition. Cognition, 106(2), 
1017-1027.  
He, Y., Ebner, N. C., & Johnson, M. K. (2011). What predicts the own-age bias in 
face recognition memory? Social Cognition, 29(1), 97-109.  
Herlitz, A., Airaksinen, E., & Nordström, E. (1999). Sex differences in episodic 
memory: The impact of verbal and visuospatial ability. Neuropsychology, 13(4), 
590-597. 
   51 
Herlitz, A., & Kabir, Z. N. (2006). Sex differences in cognition among illiterate 
Bangladeshis: A comparison with literate Bangladeshis and Swedes. 
Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 47(6), 441-447.  
Herlitz, A., Nilsson, L., & Bäckman, L. (1997). Gender differences in episodic 
memory. Memory & Cognition, 25(6), 801-811.  
Herlitz, A., & Rehnman, J. (2008). Sex differences in episodic memory. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 17(1), 52-56.  
Herlitz, A., & Yonker, J. E. (2002). Sex differences in episodic memory: The 
influence of intelligence. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 
24(1), 107-114.  
Hills, P. J. (2012). A developmental study of the own-age face recognition bias in 
children. Developmental Psychology, 48(2), 499-508.  
Hines, M. (2004). Brain gender. New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press.  
Hines, M. (2010). Sex-related variation in human behavior and the brain. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 14(10), 448-456.  
Hittelman, J. H., & Dickes, R. (1979). Sex differences in neonatal eye contact time. 
Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 25(3), 171-184.  
Hoffman, M., Gneezy, U., & List, J. A. (2011). Nurture affects gender differences in 
spatial abilities. PNAS, 108(36), 14786-14788.  
Hogervorst, E., De Jager, C., Budge, M., & Smith, A. D. (2004). Serum levels of 
estradiol and testosterone and performance in different cognitive domains in 
healthy elderly men and women. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 29(3), 405-421.  
Hooven, C. K., Chabris, C. F., Ellison, P. T., & Kosslyn, S. M. (2004). The 
relationship of male testosterone to components of mental rotation. 
Neuropsychologia, 42(6), 782-790.  
Hoss, R. A., Ramsey, J., Griffin, A. M., & Langlois, J. H. (2005). The role of facial 
attractiveness and facial masculinity/femininity in sex classification of faces. 
Perception, 34, 1459-1474. 
Hugenberg, K., Miller, J., & Claypool, H. M. (2007). Categorization and 
individuation in the cross-race recognition deficit: Toward a solution to an 
insidious problem. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43(2), 334-340.  
Hugenberg, K., Young, S. G., Bernstein, M. J., & Sacco, D. F. (2010). The 
categorization-individuation model: An integrative account of the other-race 
recognition deficit. Psychological Review, 117(4), 1168-1187. 
Hyde, J. S. (2005). The gender similarities hypothesis. American Psychologist, 60(6), 
581-592.  
Hyde, J. S., & Linn, M. C. (1988). Gender differences in verbal ability: A meta-
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 104(1), 53-53-69.  
Iidaka, T., Anderson, N. D., Kapur, S., Cabeza, R., & Craik, F. I. M. (2000). The 
effect of divided attention on encoding and retrieval in episodic memory revealed 
by positron emission tomography. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12(2), 267-
280. 
Ino, T., Nakai, R., Azuma, T., Kimura, T., & Fukuyama, H. (2010). Gender 
differences in brain activation during encoding and recognition of male and 
female faces. Brain Imaging and Behavior, 4(1), 55-67.  
Ishai, A. (2008). Let's face it: It's a cortical network. NeuroImage, 40(2), 415-419.  
Jacobs, E., & D'Esposito, M. (2011). Estrogen shapes dopamine-dependent cognitive 
processes: Implications for women's health. The Journal of Neuroscience, 31(14), 
5286-5293.  
Janowsky, J. S., Chavez, B., Zamboni, B. D., & Orwoll, E. (1998). The cognitive 
neuropsychology of sex hormones in men and women. Developmental 
Neuropsychology, 14(2-3), 421-440. 
 52 
Janssen, A. B., & Geiser, C. (2012). Cross-cultural differences in spatial abilities and 
solution strategies – An investigation in Cambodia and Germany. Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 43(4), 533-557.  
Johnson, M. H. (2005). Subcortical face processing. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 
6(10), 766-774.  
Johnson, M. H. (2011). Face processing as a brain adaptation at multiple timescales. 
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 64(10), 1873-1888.  
Kampen, D. L., & Sherwin, B. B. (1996). Estradiol is related to visual memory in 
healthy young men. Behavioral Neuroscience, 110(3), 613-617.  
Kanwisher, N. (2000). Domain specificity in face perception. Nature Neuroscience, 
3(8), 759-763.  
Kanwisher, N., McDermott, J., & Chun, M. M. (1997). The fusiform face area: A 
module in human extrastriate cortex specialized for face perception. The Journal 
of Neuroscience, 17(11), 4302-4311.  
Kanwisher, N., & Yovel, G. (2006). The fusiform face area: A cortical region 
specialized for the perception of faces. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 361(1476), 2109-2128.  
Keith, T. Z., Reynolds, M. R., Roberts, L. G., Winter, A. L., & Austin, C. A. (2011). 
Sex differences in latent cognitive abilities ages 5 to 17: Evidence from the 
differential ability Scales – Second edition. Intelligence, 39(5), 389-404.  
Kellogg, R. T. (1980). Is conscious attention necessary for long-term storage? 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning & Memory, 6(4), 379-390.  
Kelly, D. J., Liu, S., Ge, L., Quinn, P. C., Slater, A. M., Lee, K., et al. (2007). Cross-
race preferences for same-race faces extend beyond the African versus Caucasian 
contrast in 3-month-old infants. Infancy, 11(1), 87-95.  
Kelly, D. J., Quinn, P. C., Slater, A. M., Lee, K., Gibson, A., Smith, M., et al. (2005). 
Three-month-olds, but not newborns, prefer own-race faces. Developmental 
Science, 8(6), F31-F36.  
Kim, J. S., Yoon, H. W., Kim, B. S., Jeun, S. S., Jung, S. L., & Choe, B. Y. (2006). 
Racial distinction of the unknown facial identity recognition mechanism by event-
related fMRI. Neuroscience Letters, 397(3), 279-284.  
Kimura, D. (1999). Sex and cognition. US: MIT Press.  
Kimura, D., & Hampson, E. (1994). Cognitive pattern in men and women is 
influenced by fluctuations in sex hormones. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 3(2), 57-61. 
Kleider, H. M., & Goldinger, S. D. (2001). Stereotyping ricochet: Complex effects of 
racial distinctiveness on identification accuracy. Law and Human Behavior, 25, 
605-627. 
Kramer, J. H., Delis, D. C., Kaplan, E., O'Donnell, L., & Prifitera, A. (1997). 
Developmental sex differences in verbal learning. Neuropsychology, 11(4), 577-
584.  
Larsson, M., Lövdén, M., & Nilsson, L. (2003). Sex differences in recollective 
experience for olfactory and verbal information. Acta Psychologica, 112(1), 89-
103.  
Leeb, R. T., & Rejskind, F. G. (2004). Here's looking at you, kid! A longitudinal 
study of perceived gender differences in mutual gaze behavior in young infants. 
Sex Roles, 50(1-2), 1-14.  
Lehmann, C., Mueller, T., Federspiel, A., Hubl, D., Schroth, G., Huber, O., et al. 
(2004). Dissociation between overt and unconscious face processing in fusiform 
face area. NeuroImage, 21(1), 75-83.  
   53 
Lejbak, L., Vrbancic, M., & Crossley, M. (2009). The female advantage in object 
location memory is robust to verbalizability and mode of presentation of test 
stimuli. Brain and Cognition, 69(1), 148-153.  
Leopold, D. A., & Rhodes, G. (2010). A comparative view of face perception. 
Journal of Comparative Psychology, 124(3), 233-251.  
Levin, D. T. (2000). Race as a visual feature: Using visual search and perceptual 
discrimination tasks to understand face categories and the cross-race recognition 
deficit. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129(4), 559-574. 
Levin, H. S., Culhane, K. A., Hartmann, J., & Evankovich, K. (1991). Developmental 
changes in performance on tests of purported frontal lobe functioning. 
Developmental Neuropsychology, 7(3), 377-395.  
Levine, M. H., & Sutton-Smith, B. (1973). Effects of age, sex and task on visual 
behavior during dyadic interaction. Developmental Psychology, 9(3), 400-405.  
Levine, S. C., Huttenlocher, J., Taylor, A., & Langrock, A. (1999). Early sex 
differences in spatial skill. Developmental Psychology, 35(4), 940-949.  
Lewin, C., & Herlitz, A. (2002). Sex differences in face recognition – women's faces 
make the difference. Brain and Cognition, 50(1), 121-128.  
Lewin, C., Wolgers, G., & Herlitz, A. (2001). Sex differences favoring women in 
verbal but not in visuospatial episodic memory. Neuropsychology, 15(2), 165-
173.  
Li, J., Tian, M., Fang, H., Xu, M., Li, H., & Liu, J. (2010). Extraversion predicts 
individual differences in face recognition. Communicative & Integrative Biology, 
3(4), 295-298.  
Linn, M. C., & Petersen, A. C. (1985). Emergence and characterization of sex 
differences in spatial ability: A meta-analysis. Child Development, 56(6), 1479-
1498.  
Liu, J., & Lynn, R. (2011). Factor structure and sex differences on the Wechsler 
preschool and primary scale of intelligence in China, Japan and United States. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 50(8), 1222-1226.  
Lombroso, C. (1895). The man of genius. New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons.  
Lowe, P. A., Mayfield, J. W., & Reynolds, C. R. (2003). Gender differences in 
memory test performance among children and adolescents. Archives of Clinical 
Neuropsychology, 18(8), 865-878.  
Luetters, C., Huang, M., Seeman, T., Buckwalter, G., Meyer, P. M., Avis, N. E., et al. 
(2007). Menopause transition stage and endogenous estradiol and follicle-
stimulating hormone levels are not related to cognitive performance: Cross-
sectional results from the study of women's health across the nation (SWAN). 
Journal of Women's Health, 16(3), 331-344.  
Macchi Cassia, V. (2011). Age biases in face processing: The effects of experience 
across development. British Journal of Psychology, 102(4), 816-829.  
Maccoby, E. E., & Jacklin, C. N. (1974). The psychology of sex differences. US: 
Stanford University Press.  
Maner, J. K., Kenrick, D. T., Becker, D. V., Delton, A. W., Hofer, B., Wilbur, C. J., 
& Neuberg, S. L. (2003). Sexually selective cognition: Beauty captures the mind 
of the beholder. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(6), 1107-1120.  
Mann, V. A., Sasanuma, S., Sakuma, N., & Masaki, S. (1990). Sex differences in 
cognitive abilities: A cross-cultural perspective. Neuropsychologia, 28(10), 1063-
1077.  
Mason, S. E. (1986). Age and gender as factors in facial recognition and 
identification. Experimental Aging Research, 12(3), 151-154.  
 54 
Mather, M., Lighthall, N. R., Nga, L., & Gorlick, M. A. (2010). Sex differences in 
how stress affects brain activity during face viewing. Neuroreport, 21(14), 933-
937.  
Maurer, D., Le Grand, R., & Mondloch, C. J. (2002). The many faces of configural 
processing. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(6), 255-260.  
McBain, R., Norton, D., & Chen, Y. (2009). Females excel at basic face perception. 
Acta Psychologica, 130(2), 168-173.  
McGee, M. G. (1979). Human spatial abilities: Psychometric studies and 
environmental, genetic, hormonal, and neurological influences. Psychological 
Bulletin, 86(5), 889-918.  
McGugin, R. W., Tanaka, J. W., Lebrecht, S., Tarr, M. J., & Gauthier, I. (2011). 
Race‐specific perceptual discrimination improvement following short 
individuation training with faces. Cognitive Science, 35(2), 330-347.  
McKelvie, S. J. (1981). Sex differences in memory for faces. Journal of Psychology: 
Interdisciplinary and Applied, 107(1), 109-125.  
McKelvie, S. J. (1987). Sex differences, lateral reversal, and pose as factors in 
recognition memory for photographs of faces. Journal of General Psychology, 
114(1), 13-37.  
McKelvie, S. J., Standing, L., St. Jean, D., & Law, J. (1993). Gender differences in 
recognition memory for faces and cars: Evidence for the interest hypothesis. 
Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 31(5), 447-448.  
Megreya, A. M., Bindemann, M., & Havard, C. (2011). Sex differences in unfamiliar 
face identification: Evidence from matching tasks. Acta Psychologica, 137(1), 83-
89. 
Meissner, C. A., & Brigham, J. C. (2001). Thirty years of investigating the own-race 
bias in memory for faces: A meta-analytic review. Psychology, Public Policy, and 
Law, 7(1), 3-35.  
Meissner, C. A., Brigham, J. C., & Butz, D. A. (2005). Memory for own- and other-
race faces: A dual-process approach. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 19(5), 545-
567.  
Michel, C., Rossion, B., Han, J., Chung, C., & Caldara, R. (2006). Holistic processing 
is finely tuned for faces of one's own race. Psychological Science, 17(7), 608-615. 
Minnebusch, D. A., Suchan, B., Köster, O., & Daum, I. (2009). A bilateral 
occipitotemporal network mediates face perception. Behavioural Brain Research, 
198(1), 179-185.  
Moffat, S. D., & Hampson, E. (1996). A curvilinear relationship between testosterone 
and spatial cognition in humans: Possible influence of hand preference. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 21(3), 323-337.  
Moore, D. S., & Johnson, S. P. (2008). Mental rotation in human infants: A sex 
difference. Psychological Science, 19(11), 1063-1066.  
Moscovitch, M., Winocur, G., & Behrmann, M. (1997). What is special about face 
recognition? Nineteen experiments on a person with visual object agnosia and 
dyslexia but normal face recognition. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 9(5), 
555-604.  
Navarrete, C. D., Olsson, A., Ho, A. K., Mendes, W. B., Thomsen, L., & Sidanius, J. 
(2009). Fear extinction to an out-group face: The role of target gender. 
Psychological Science, 20(2), 155-158.  
Naveh-Benjamin, M., Craik, F. I. M., Gavrilescu, D., & Anderson, N. D. (2000). 
Asymmetry between encoding and retrieval processes: Evidence from divided 
attention and a calibration analysis. Memory & Cognition, 28(6), 965-976. 
   55 
Naveh-Benjamin, M., Guez, J., & Marom, M. (2003). The effects of divided attention 
at encoding on item and associative memory. Memory & Cognition, 31(7), 1021-
1035. 
Nelson, C. A. (2001). The development and neural bases of face recognition. Infant 
and Child Development, 10, 3-18. 
Newcombe, N. & Dubas, J.S. (1986). Individual differences in cognitive ability: Are they 
related to timing of puberty? In R.M. Lerner & T.T. Foch (Eds.), Biological-
psychosocial interactions in early adolescence: A life-span perspective, (pp. 249-
302). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Ng, W., & Lindsay, R. C. L. (1994). Cross-race facial recognition: Failure of the 
contact hypothesis. Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology, 25(2), 217-232.  
Nyborg, H. (1983). Spatial ability in men and women: Review and new theory. 
Advances in Behaviour Research and Therapy, 5, 89-140. 
O'Bryant, S. E., Hilsabeck, R. C., McCaffrey, R. J., & Gouvier, W. D. (2003). The 
recognition memory test: Examination of ethnic differences and norm validity. 
Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology, 18(2), 135-143.  
O'Toole, A. J., Deffenbacher, K. A., Valentin, D., McKee, K., Huff, D., & Abdi, H. 
(1998). The perception of face gender: The role of stimulus structure in 
recognition and classification. Memory & Cognition, 26(1), 146-160.  
Osofsky, J. D., & O'Connell, E. J. (1977). Patterning of newborn behavior in an urban 
population. Child Development, 48(2), 532-536. 
Owen, K., & Lynn, R. (1993). Sex differences in primary cognitive abilities among 
Blacks, Indians and Whites in South Africa. Journal of Biosocial Science, 25(4), 
557-560.  
Pascalis, O., de Haan, M., & Nelson, C. A. (2002). Is face processing species-specific 
during the first year of life? Science, 296(5571), 1321-1323.  
Pascalis, O., de Haan, M., Nelson, C. A., & de Schonen, S. (1998). Long-term 
recognition memory for faces assessed by visual paired comparison in 3- and 6-
month-old infants. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 24(1), 249-260.  
Pascalis, O., de Vivies, X. D., Anzures, G., Quinn, P. C., Slater, A. M., Tanaka, J. W., 
& Lee, K. (2011). Development of face processing. Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews. Cognitive Science, 2(6), 666-675.  
Pascalis, O., Scott, L. S., Kelly, D. J., Shannon, R. W., Nicholson, E., Coleman, M., 
& Nelson, C. A. (2005). Plasticity of face processing in infancy. PNAS, 102(14), 
5297-5300.  
Pelphrey, K. A., Morris, J. P., Michelich, C. R., Allison, T., & McCarthy, G. (2005). 
Functional anatomy of biological motion perception in posterior temporal cortex: 
An fMRI study of eye, mouth and hand movements. Cerebral Cortex, 15(12), 
1866-1876.  
Picozzi, M., Macchi Cassia, V., Turati, C., & Vescovo, E. (2009). The effect of 
inversion on 3- to 5-year-olds’ recognition of face and nonface visual objects. 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 102(4), 487-502.  
Pitcher, D., Walsh, V., & Duchaine, B. (2011). The role of the occipital face area in 
the cortical face perception network. Experimental Brain Research, 209(4), 481-
493.  
Prentice, D. A., & Miller, D. T. (1992). When small effects are impressive. 
Psychological Bulletin, 112(1), 160-164.  
Prince, S. E., Dennis, N. A., & Cabeza, R. (2009). Encoding and retrieving faces and 
places: Distinguishing process- and stimulus-specific differences in brain activity. 
Neuropsychologia, 47(11), 2282-2289.  
 56 
Proverbio, A. M., Brignone, V., Matarazzo, S., Del Zotto, M., & Zani, A. (2006). 
Gender differences in hemispheric asymmetry for face processing. BMC 
Neuroscience, 7, 44.  
Proverbio, A. M., Riva, F., Martin, E., & Zani, A. (2010). Face coding is bilateral in 
the female brain. PloS One, 5(6), e11242.  
Puts, D. A., Cárdenas, R. A., Bailey, D. H., Burriss, R. P., Jordan, C. L., & 
Breedlove, S. M. (2010). Salivary testosterone does not predict mental rotation 
performance in men or women. Hormones and Behavior, 58(2), 282-289.  
Quinn, P. C., & Liben, L. S. (2008). A sex difference in mental rotation in young 
infants. Psychological Science, 19(11), 1067-1070.  
Quinn, P. C., Yahr, J., Kuhn, A., Slater, A. M., & Pascalis, O. (2002). Representation 
of the gender of human faces by infants: A preference for female. Perception, 
31(9), 1109-1121.  
Ramsey, J. L., Langlois, J. H., & Marti, N. C. (2005). Infant categorization of faces: 
Ladies first. Developmental Review, 25(2), 212-246.  
Ramsey-Rennels, J. L., & Langlois, J. H. (2006). Infants' differential processing of 
female and male faces. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15(2), 59-
62.  
Rehnman, J., & Herlitz, A. (2006). Higher face recognition ability in girls: Magnified 
by own-sex and own-ethnicity bias. Memory, 14(3), 289-296.  
Rehnman, J., & Herlitz, A. (2007). Women remember more faces than men do. Acta 
Psychologica, 124(3), 344-355.  
Reiter, E. O., & Grumbach, M. M. (1982). Neuroendocrine control mechanisms and 
the onset of puberty. Annual Review of Physiology, 44, 595-613.  
Rennels, J. L., & Davis, R. E. (2008). Facial experience during the first year. Infant 
Behavior & Development, 31(4), 665-678.  
Rhodes, G., Byatt, G., Michie, P. T., & Puce, A. (2004). Is the fusiform face area 
specialized for faces, individuation, or expert individuation? Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 16(2), 189-203. 
Rhodes, G., Hayward, W. G., & Winkler, C. (2006). Expert face coding: Configural 
and component coding of own-race and other-race faces. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 13(3), 499-505.  
Rhodes, G., Ewing, L., Hayward, W. G., Maurer, D., Mondloch, C. J., & Tanaka, J. 
W. (2009). Contact and other-race effects in configural and component processing 
of faces. British Journal of Psychology, 100(4), 717-728. 
Rhodes, M. G., & Anastasi, J. S. (2012). The own-age bias in face recognition: A 
meta-analytic and theoretical review. Psychological Bulletin, 138(1), 146-174.  
Rossion, B., Hanseeuw, B., & Dricot, L. (2012). Defining face perception areas in the 
human brain: A large-scale factorial fMRI face localizer analysis. Brain and 
Cognition, 79(2), 138-157.  
Russell, R., Duchaine, B., & Nakayama, K. (2009). Super-recognizers: People with 
extraordinary face recognition ability. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(2), 
252-257.  
Sæther, L., Van Belle, W., Laeng, B., Brennen, T., & Øvervoll, M. (2009). Anchoring 
gaze when categorizing faces’ sex: Evidence from eye-tracking data. Vision 
Research, 49(23), 2870-2880.  
Scherf, K. S., Behrmann, M., & Dahl, R. E. (2012). Facing changes and changing 
faces in adolescence: A new model for investigating adolescent-specific 
interactions between pubertal, brain and behavioral development. Developmental 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 2(2), 199-219.  
   57 
Scherf, K. S., Behrmann, M., Humphreys, K., & Luna, B. (2007). Visual category-
selectivity for faces, places and objects emerges along different developmental 
trajectories. Developmental Science, 10(4), 16.  
Schiltz, C., Dricot, L., Goebel, R., & Rossion, B. (2010). Holistic perception of 
individual faces in the right middle fusiform gyrus as evidenced by the composite 
face illusion. Journal of Vision, 10(2), 25.1-2516.  
Sergerie, K., Lepage, M., & Armony, J. L. (2006). A process-specific functional 
dissociation of the amygdala in emotional memory. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 18(8), 1359-1367.  
Shadish, W. R., & Haddock, C. K. (2009). Combining estimates of effect size. In H. 
Cooper, L. V. Hedges, & J. C. Valentine (Eds.), The handbook of research 
synthesis and meta-analysis (2nd ed., pp. 257-277). New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation. 
Sherman, B. M., & Korenman, S. G. (1975). Hormonal characteristics of the human 
menstrual cycle throughout reproductive life. The Journal of Clinical 
Investigation, 55(4), 699-706. 
Sincoff, J. B., & Sternberg, R. J. (1988). Development of verbal fluency abilities and 
strategies in elementary-school-age children. Developmental Psychology, 24(5), 
646-653. 
Silverman, I., Kastuk, D., Choi, J., & Phillips, K. (1999). Testosterone levels and 
spatial ability in men. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 24(8), 813-822.  
Sisk, C. L., & Zehr, J. L. (2005). Pubertal hormones organize the adolescent brain 
and behavior. Frontiers in Neuroendocrinology, 26(3-4), 163-174.  
Slone, A. E., Brigham, J. C., & Meissner, C. A. (2000). Social and cognitive factors 
affecting the own-race bias in whites. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 
22(2), 71-84.  
Snodgrass, J. G., & Corwin, J. (1988). Pragmatics of measuring recognition memory:  
Applications to dementia and amnesia. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 117, 34-50.  
Sporer, S. L. (2001). Recognizing faces of other ethnic groups: An integration of 
theories. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 7(1), 36-97.  
Sugisaki, Y., & Brown, W. (1916). The correlation between the sex of observers and 
the sex of pictures recognized. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1(4), 351-
354.  
Sugita, Y. (2008). Face perception in monkeys reared with no exposure to faces. 
PNAS, 105(1), 394-398.  
Tahmasebi, A. M., Artiges, E., Banaschewski, T., Barker, G. J., Bruehl, R., Buchel, 
C., et al. (2012). Creating probabilistic maps of the face network in the adolescent 
brain: A multicentre functional MRI study. Human Brain Mapping, 33(4), 938-
957.  
Tanaka, J. W., & Farah, M. J. (1993). Parts and wholes in face recognition. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A: Human Experimental 
Psychology, 46A(2), 225-245.  
Tanaka, J. W., Kay, J. B., Grinnell, E., Stansfield, B., & Szechter, L. (1998). Face 
recognition in young children: When the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
Visual Cognition, 5(4), 479-496.  
Tanaka, J. W., Kiefer, M., & Bukach, C. M. (2004). A holistic account of the own-
race effect in face recognition: Evidence from a cross-cultural study. Cognition, 
93(1), B1-B9. 
Tanaka, J. W., & Pierce, L. J. (2009). The neural plasticity of other-race face 
recognition. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 9(1), 122-131.  
 58 
Tanaka, J. W., & Sengco, J. A. (1997). Features and their configuration in face 
recognition. Memory & Cognition, 25(5), 583-592.  
Tanaka, J. W., & Taylor, M. (1991). Object categories and expertise: Is the basic 
level in the eye of the beholder? Cognitive Psychology, 23(3), 457-482. 
Thilers, P. MacDonald, W. S., & Herlitz, A. (2006). The effect of endogenous 
free testosterone on cognitive performance: A population-based study in 35 to 
90 year old men and women. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 31, 565-576. 
Thompson Woolley, H. (1914). The psychology of sex. Psychological Bulletin, 
11(10), 353-379. 
Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 53(1), 1-25.  
Tuomisto, H., Salo, P., Saarinen, R., Kalleinen, N., & Polo-Kantola, P. (2012). The 
association of serum oestradiol level, age, and education with cognitive 
performance in peri- and late postmenopausal women. Maturitas, 71(2), 173-179.  
Valentine, T. (1991). A unified account of the effects of distinctiveness, inversion, 
and race in face recognition. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 
A: Human Experimental Psychology, 43(2), 161-204.  
Valero-Politi, J., & Fuentes-Arderiu, X. (1998). Annual rhythmic variations of 
follitropin, lutropin, testosterone and sex-hormone-binding globulin in men. 
Clinica Chimica Acta, 271(1), 57-71.  
van Wingen, G., Mattern, C., Verkes, R. J., Buitelaar, J., & Fernandez, G. (2008). 
Testosterone biases automatic memory processes in women towards potential 
mates. NeuroImage, 43(1), 114-120.  
Vermeulen, A., Verdonck, L., & Kaufman, J. M. (1999). A critical evaluation of simple 
methods for the estimation of free testosterone in serum. The Journal of 
Clinical Endocrionology and Metabolism, 84, 3666-3672.  
Voyer, D., Postma, A., Brake, B., & Imperato-McGinley, J. (2007). Gender 
differences in object location memory: A meta-analysis. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 14(1), 23-38.  
Voyer, D., Voyer, S., & Bryden, M. P. (1995). Magnitude of sex differences in spatial 
abilities: A meta-analysis and consideration of critical variables. Psychological 
Bulletin, 117(2), 250-270.  
Vuilleumier, P., Armony, J. L., Driver, J., & Dolan, R. J. (2003). Distinct spatial 
frequency sensitivities for processing faces and emotional expressions. Nature 
Neuroscience, 6(6), 624-631.  
Waber, D. P. (1976). Sex differences in cognition: A function of maturation rate? 
Science, 192(4239), 572-573.  
Waber, D. P. (1977). Sex differences in mental abilities, hemispheric lateralization, 
and rate of physical growth at adolescence. Developmental Psychology, 13(1), 29-
38.  
Wallen, K. (2009). The organizational hypothesis: Reflections on the 50th 
anniversary of the publication of Phoenix, Goy, Gerall, and Young (1959). 
Hormones and Behavior, 55(5), 561-565.  
Warren, M. F., Serby, M. J., & Roane, D. M. (2008). The effects of testosterone on 
cognition in elderly men: A review. CNS Spectrums, 13(10), 887-897.  
Weiss, E. M., Ragland, J. D., Brensinger, C. M., Bilker, W. B., Deisenhammer, E. A., 
& Delazer, M. (2006). Sex differences in clustering and switching in verbal 
fluency tasks. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 12(4), 
502-509.  
Wilhelm, O., Herzmann, G., Kunina, O., Danthiir, V., Schacht, A., & Sommer, W. 
(2010). Individual differences in perceiving and recognizing faces - one element 
   59 
of social cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99(3), 530-
548.  
Witryol, S. L., & Kaess, W. A. (1957). Sex differences in social memory tasks. The 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 54(3), 343-346.  
Wojciulik, E., Kanwisher, N., & Driver, J. (1998). Covert visual attention modulates 
face-specific activity in the human fusiform gyrus: FMRI study. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 79(3), 1574-1578. 
Wolf, O. T., & Kirschbaum, C. (2002). Endogenous estradiol and testosterone levels 
are associated with cognitive performance in older women and men. Hormones 
and Behavior, 41(3), 259-266.  
Wright, D. B., Boyd, C. E., & Tredoux, C. G. (2003). Inter-racial contact and the 
own-race bias for face recognition in South Africa and England. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 17(3), 365-373. 
Wright, D. B., & Sladden, B. (2003). An own gender bias and the importance of hair 
in face recognition. Acta Psychologica, 114(1), 101-114.  
Yin, R. K. (1969). Looking at upside-down faces. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 81(1), 141-145.  
Yonker, J. E., Eriksson, E., Nilsson, L., & Herlitz, A. (2006). Negative association of 
testosterone on spatial visualization in 35 to 80 year old men. Cortex, 42(3), 376-
386. 
Young, A. W., Hellawell, D., & Hay, D. C. (1987). Configurational information in 




List of dissertations from the Aging Research Center and the Stockholm Gerontology 
Research Center, 1991-2012.  
 
1991 
Herlitz Agneta. Remembering in Alzheimer’s disease. Utilization of cognitive support. 
 
1992 
Borell Lena. The activity life of persons with a dementia disease. 
 
1993 
Fratiglioni Laura. Epidemiology of Alzheimer’s disease. Issues of etiology and 
validity. 
Almkvist Ove. Alzheimer’s disease and related dementia disorders: 
Neuropsychological identification, differentiation, and progression. 
Basun Hans. Biological markers in Alzheimer’s disease. Diagnostic implications. 
 
1994 
Grafström Margareta. The experience of burden in care of elderly persons with 
dementia. (Karolinska Institutet and Umeå University) 
Holmén Karin. Loneliness among elderly - Implications for those with cognitive 
impairment. (Umeå University) 
Josephsson Staffan. Everyday activities as meeting-places in dementia. 
Stigsdotter-Neely Anna. Memory training in late adulthood: Issues of maintenance, 
transfer and individual differences. 
Forsell Yvonne. Depression and dementia in the elderly. 
 
1995 
Mattiasson Anne-Cathrine. Autonomy in nursing home settings. 
Grut Michaela. Clinical aspects of cognitive functioning in aging and dementia: Data 
from a population-based study of very old adults. 
 
1996 
Wahlin Åke. Episodic memory functioning in very old age: Individual differences and 
utilization of cognitive support. 
Wills Philippa. Drug use in the elderly: Who? What? & Why? (Licentiate thesis) 
Lipinska Terzis Beata. Memory and knowledge in mild Alzheimer’s disease. 
 
1997 
Larsson Maria. Odor and source remembering in adulthood and aging: Influences of 
semantic activation and item richness. 
Almberg Britt. Family caregivers experiences of strain in caring for a demented 
elderly person (Licentiate thesis) 
 
1998 
Agüero-Eklund Hedda. Natural history of Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias. 
Guo Zhenchao. Blood pressure and dementia in the very old. An epidemiologic study. 
Björk Hassing Linda. Episodic memory functioning in nonagenarians. Effects of 
demographic factors, vitamin status, depression and dementia. (In collaboration with 
the Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Sweden) 
   61 
Hillerås Pernilla. Well-being among the very old. A survey on a sample aged 90 years 
and above (Licentiate thesis) 
 
1999 
Almberg Britt. Family caregivers caring for relatives with dementia – Pre- and post-
death experiences. 
Robins Wahlin Tarja-Brita. Cognitive functioning in late senescence. Influences of 
age and health. 
Zhu Li. Cerebrovascular disease and dementia. A population-based study. 
 
2000 
Hillerås Pernilla. Well-being among the very old. A survey on a sample aged 90 years 
and above. (In collaboration with H. M. Queen Sophia University College of Nursing, 
Stockholm, Sweden) 




Jansson Wallis. Family-based dementia care. Experiences from the perspective of 
spouses and adult children. 
Kabir Nahar Zarina. The emerging elderly population in Bangladesh: Aspects of their 
health and social situation. 
Wang Hui-Xin. The impact of lifestyles on the occurrence of dementia. 
 
2002 
Fahlander Kjell. Cognitive functioning in aging and dementia: The role of psychiatric 
and somatic factors. 
Giron Maria Stella T. The rational use of drugs in a population of very old persons. 
 
2003 
Jönsson Linus. Economic evaluation of treatments for Alzheimer’s disease. 
 
2004 
Berger Anna-Karin. Old age depression: Occurrence and influence on cognitive 
functioning in aging and Alzheimer’s disease 
Cornelius Christel. Drug use in the elderly - Risk or protection? Findings from the 
Kungsholmen project 
Larsson Kristina. According to need? Predicting use of formal and informal care in a 
Swedish urban elderly population. (Stockholm University) 
Palmer Katie. Early detection of Alzheimer’s disease and dementia in the general 
population. Results from the Kungsholmen Project. 
Qiu Chengxuan. The relation of blood pressure to dementia in the elderly: A 
community-based longitudinal study 
 
2005 
Derwinger Anna. Develop your memory strategies! Self-generated versus mnemonic 
strategy training in old age: Maintenance, forgetting, transfer, and age differences. 
De Ronchi Diana. Education and dementing disorders. The role of schooling in 
dementia and cognitive impairment. 
Passare Galina. Drug use and side effects in the elderly. Findings from the 
Kungsholmen Project. 
 62 
Jones Sari. Cognitive functioning in the preclinical stages of Alzheimer’s disease and 
vascular dementia. 
Karp Anita. Psychosocial factors in relation to development of dementia in late-life: A 
life course approach within the Kungsholmen Project. 
Nilsson Jan. Understanding health-related quality of life in old age. A cross-sectional 
study of elderly people in rural Bangladesh. 
 
2006 
Jonsson Laukka Erika. Cognitive functioning during the transition from normal aging 
to dementia. 
Klarin Inga. Drug use in the elderly – are quantity and quality compatible. 
Ngandu Tiia. Lifestyle-related risk factors in dementia and mild cognitive impairment: 
A population-based study. 
Nilsson Erik. Diabetes and cognitive functioning: The role of age and comorbidity. 
 
2007 
Beckman Anna. Medication management and patient compliance in old age. 
Ferdous Tamanna. Prevalence of malnutrition and determinants of nutritional status 
among elderly people. A population-based study of rural Bangladesh. (Licentiate 
thesis) 
Nordberg Gunilla. Formal and informal care in an urban and a rural population. Who? 
When? What? 
Rehnman Jenny. The role of gender in face recognition. (Stockholm University) 
Westerbotn Margareta. Drug use among the very old living in ordinary households- 
Aspects on well-being, cognitive and functional ability. 
 
2008 
Gavazzeni Joachim. Age differences in arousal, perception of affective pictures, and 
emotional memory enhancement. (Stockholm University) 
Marengoni Alessandra. Prevalence and impact of chronic diseases and multimorbidity 
in the aging population: A clinical and epidemiological approach.  
Rovio Suvi. The effect of physical activity and other lifestyle factors on dementia, 
Alzheimer’s disease and structural brain changes. 
 
2009 
Atti Anna-Rita. The effect of somatic disorders on brain aging and dementia: Findings 
from population- based studies. 
Livner Åsa. Prospective and retrospective memory in normal and pathological aging. 
Paillard-Borg Stephanie. Leisure activities at old age and their influence on dementia 
development. 
Rana M AKM. The impact of health promotion on health in old age: Results from 
community-based studies in rural Bangladesh. 




Fors Stephan. Blood on the tracks. Life-course perspectives on health inequalities in 
later life. 




   63 
Caracciolo Barbara. Cognitive impairment in the nondemented elderly: Occurrence, 
risk factors, progression.  
Rieckmann Anna. Human aging, dopamine, and cognition. Molecular and functional 
imaging of executive functions and implicit learning.  
Schön Per. Gender matters. Differences and change in disability and health among our 
oldest women and men. 
 
2012 
Haasum Ylva. Drug use in institutionalized and home-dwelling elderly persons.  
Mangialasche Francesca. Exploring the role of vitamin E in Alzheimer’s disease: An 
epidemiological and clinical perspective.  
 
